Legislative Lapses: Some Suggestions for
Probate Code Reform in Washington'
Mark Reutlinger
I.
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INTRODUCTION

The first legislation on the subject of wills and probate in
the State (then Territory) of Washington was enacted in 1854,1
and the first reported appellate case to consider the subject
was handed down in 1860. 4 Since those beginnings there have
been numerous further enactments, in the form of amendments and wholly new codifications, and hundreds of cases
interpreting and reinterpreting those enactments and the common law. It is, then, not surprising that in the course of more
than a century there have been a few lapses in the continuity
and consistency of both the legislative and the decisional law of
wills. Many of these lapses have escaped notice over the years
merely because the situations with which they deal have not
arisen. Others have actually caused difficulties for practitioners and courts, but they have yet to be satisfactorily clarified or
reconciled. While courts can, of course, use their ingenuity to
avoid irrational results or to fill statutory gaps, it is far better
that these problems be addressed by the legislature and
resolved in a manner that takes into account more than the
individual circumstances of the parties to a particular lawsuit.
The purpose of this Article is to point out a number of
lapses in the law of wills which were encountered in the
course of research for a treatise on that subject, and to suggest
possible ways to reconcile or eliminate them. Because that
research was probably the first attempt in some time to look at
the entire law of wills in Washington as a unified whole, it
1. This article is based in part on material in M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN,
LAW OF WILuS AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION (Butterworth 1985).
Copyright 1985 by the author and by Butterworth Legal Publishers. Parts of this
article also appeared in abbreviated form in the WASHINGTON STATE BAR NEWS, Mar.
1986, at 27.
2. Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. J.D. 1968, A.B.
1965, University of California at Berkeley.
3. 1 Wash. Sess. Acts p. 315.
4. Ward v. Moorey, 1 Wash. Terr. 104 (Sup. Ct. 1860).
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afforded the first opportunity in many years to discover and
consider some of the more obscure (as well as the more obvious) lapses in the law. In addition, the Article will discuss
areas of the law that are nominally consistent, but in my opinion are in need of rethinking in light of current social or legal
developments.
II. AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE
In several instances the legislature has used statutory language that is ambiguous or incomplete, or that seems to permit
a reading which leads to a result that the legislature probably
did not intend. Usually this has occurred when the statute was
amended in some respect and the new language failed to
express clearly the legislature's intention. The following are
instances in which I believe the legislature did not say, or say
clearly, what it meant to say; however, in the event the legislature meant just what it said, I am expressing disagreement
with the legislature's position and suggesting an alternative
approach.
A.

Interested Witnesses

At common law, attesting witnesses to a will who were
also named as beneficiaries, or had some beneficial interest,
were considered incompetent to act as witnesses; therefore, if
their signatures were necessary to make up the number of witnesses required by the statute, the will would fail.' This rule
has evolved to the point that under the Uniform Probate Code
there is no such thing as an "interested witness": all otherwisecompetent persons are eligible to sign a will.6 Under present
Washington law, an interested witness is competent to witness
a will, but his legacy is void unless one of two conditions is
met: (1) there are "two other competent witnesses" to the will
(in which case the interested witness is a supernumerary, and
his entire legacy is valid); or (2) he would have been entitled to
5. State ex rel. Schirmer v. Superior Court, 143 Wash. 578, 581, 255 P. 960, 962
(1927); T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 65 at 309 (2d ed. 1953)
[hereinafter ATKINSON].
6. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-505 (1977) provides:
Who May Witness.(a) Any person generally competent to be a witness may act as a witness to a
will
(b) A will or any provision thereof is not invalid because the will is signed by
an interested witness.
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some amount if the will were not established (in which case he
receives that amount or the amount of the legacy, whichever is
less).7 The first condition presents certain language problems.
1.

"Witnesses" Required for Supernumerary Status

The statute requires signing by two other competent witnesses, but does not specify two other competent subscribing
witnesses. This could be read, as it has been in other jurisdictions,8 to mean that if any two persons who are competent to
testify observed the signing of the will, this suffices to render
the interested witness a supernumerary. Such a reading is literally possible, but it would be incorrect for several reasons.
First, there is a well-settled meaning of the word "witness" in
the context of a will, and that meaning is subscribing witness,
one who has signed the will.' Second, the very next phrase in
the statute uses the same term "competent witness," but in a
context that clearly requires the interpretation "subscribing
witness": "a mere charge on the estate of the testator for the
payment of debts shall not prevent his creditors from being
competent witnesses to his will."1 Because being a creditor
would not ordinarily render one "incompetent" except arguably (if not for this proviso) in the sense of "incompetent to subscribe as an interested witness," the reference in this latter
phrase must be to subscribing witnesses.1 ' The ambiguity is
cleared up easily by adding the word "subscribing" before "witnesses" in reference to those who render an interested witness
a supernumerary.
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.160 (1985).

The full text of the statute is:

All beneficial devises, legacies, and gifts whatever, made or given in any will
to a subscribing witness thereto, shall be void unless there are two other
competent witnesses to the same; but a mere charge on the estate of the

testator for the payment of debts shall not prevent his creditors from being
competent witnesses to his will. If such witness, to whom any beneficial
devise, legacy or gift may have been made or given, would have been entitled

to any share in the testator's estate in case the will is not established, then so
much of the estate as would have descended or would have been distributed to
such witness shall be saved to him as will not exceed the value of the devise
or bequest made to him in the will; and he may recover the same from the
devisees or legatees named in the will in proportion to and out of the parts
devised and bequeathed to him.
8. See, e.g., In re Johnson's Will, 175 Wis. 1, 183 N.W. 888 (1921). See 2 W. BOWE &
D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS § 19.104 (rev. ed. 1960) [hereinafter PAGE ON WILLS].
9. See supra note 8.
10. See supra note 7 for text of WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.160.
11. See 2 PAGE ON WILLS § 19.96 at 8 (explains the origin of the creditor-

incompetency rule).
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Competency of Interested Witnesses

The statute does not specifically state that interested witnesses are competent to attest a will. As indicated above, at
common law they were not, so this cannot be taken for
granted. In fact, the aforementioned proviso regarding creditors lends credence to the interpretation that interested witnesses are not competent: by stating that the indirect interest
of creditors will not render them incompetent, the statute
seems to imply that other forms of interest may indeed have
such an effect. Nevertheless, the statute would be meaningless
if it did not contemplate the possibility of a valid will with
competent but interested witnesses. If interested witnesses
were incompetent, there would be no need to declare void the
legacy of an interested, nonsupernumerary witness. Thus the
statute has12 been interpreted to render interested witnesses
competent.
Unfortunately, including interested witnesses in the statute's definition of "competent" witnesses raises another difficulty caused by imprecise wording. The statute by its terms
requires two other "competent," not "competent disinterested"
witnesses to attest in order to render an additional interested
witness a supernumerary. If interested witnesses are themselves competent, the following situation could well arise: a
will attested by three witnesses, all of whom are interested.
Each might point to the other two "competent" witnesses and
declare himself a supernumerary under the literal language of
the statute. Clearly the legislature did not contemplate such a
result, which would award full legacies to each of three interested witnesses, but deny any legacy to both if there were only
two. The obvious intent of the statute is to prevent an interested witness whose attestation is necessary to validate a will
from taking under it any more than he would take without it.
It is necessary, therefore, to view the witnesses as a group: if
all three had not attested, the will would fail; and all three,
viewed together, cannot (by definition) all be supernumeraries." It follows that what the statute means to require is two
other competent disinterested witnesses.
This interpretation of the statute is consistent with the
12. Schirmer, 143 Wash. at 581, 255 P. at 961.
13. Compare the situation in which there are two disinterested and three
interested witnesses. All three can be supernumeraries because elimination of all
three together still leaves two valid witnesses.
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clause discussed earlier which provides that the interest of
creditors does not render them incompetent. Because no interest of a witness renders the witness incompetent in the sense
of being unable to attest, the purpose of the creditor clause
must be to make it clear that a witness/creditor is not prevented from taking under the will (i.e., is not prevented from
being treated as disinterested). It follows that when section
11.12.160 uses the term "competent," it does not mean "qualified to attest," but "disinterested."
Washington's legislature is not the first to create the sort
of confusion illustrated above;1 4 but the fact that it has company does not mean that the confusion should be allowed to
continue. The problem of the meaning of "competency" can be
easily resolved by the simple addition of the words "and disinterested" following the word "competent" in the first phrase of
section 11.12.160, and the words "considered both competent
and disinterested" in place of the word "competent" in the second phrase.' 5 The better wording, then, would be
All beneficial devises, legacies, and gifts whatever, made or
given in any will to a subscribing witness thereto, shall be
void unless there are two other competent and disinterested
witnesses to the same; but a mere charge on the estate of the
testator for the payment of debts shall not prevent his crediboth competent and disinterested
tors from being considered
6
will.'
his
to
witnesses
B.

Revocation, Revival, and Republication
1.

Revocation

Section 11.12.040 of the Revised Code of Washington refers
to the manner in which a will can be revoked.' The first such
14. See, e.g., 2 PAGE ON WiLLS, supra note 8, § 19.104 at 208; Note, SUPERNUMERARY WITNESSES AND EVASIONS OF THE WILLs AcT, 53 HARV. L. REV. 858 (1940).
15. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 633.281 (West 1964).

16. In suggesting amended language, no attempt has been made to modernize
existing language (e.g., the elimination of redundancies such as "devises, legacies, and
gifts" and "made or given"), since every such change in isolation carries with it a
potential inconsistency with other sections not so amended. However, if the legislature
accepts this article's suggestion for a comprehensive review and redrafting of the
probate code, such modernization should be a part of the process.
17. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.040 (1985) provides:
A will, or any part thereof, can be revoked
(1) By a written will; or
(2) By being burnt, torn, canceled, obliterated or destroyed, with the intent

and for the purpose of revoking the same, by the testator himself or by
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manner is "[b]y a written will." While this appears to be a simple enough method, it is an unnecessary source of potential
confusion. True, a "written will" can, and usually does, revoke
(in whole or in part) an earlier will, either expressly through a
revocation clause or by implication through inconsistency.
However, a "written will" need not do so: it may merely add
provisions that neither state an intent to revoke nor are inconsistent with any provision of the earlier will. For example, the
first will might give "my car to X," and have no residuary
clause, leaving the rest of the testator's estate undisposed of.
The second will might give "my house to Y," without purporting to affect the first disposition.' 8 Does the first revoke the
second in any way? Surely not: both should be valid. While a
contrary interpretation would not be likely, it is certainly possible.'9 The statute should say exactly what it means, which
presumably is that a will can be revoked by a written will
"which revokes the prior will expressly or by inconsistency."2 0
This language would also make it clear that inconsistency in a
later will or codicil does revoke the former will by implication.
A codicil, for example, might be said merely to "supersede,"
rather than "revoke," an inconsistent part of the will. This distinction can be significant in the context of the revival statute.
2.
a.

Revival

Re-execution and Republication

Washington has what is sometimes referred to as an "antirevival statute." According to section 11.12.080 of the Revised
Code of Washington,2 1 if after making a will the testator executes a "second will," the revocation (by physical act or otheranother person in his presence and by his direction. If such act is done by any
person other than the testator, the direction of the testator and the facts of
such injury or destruction must be proved by two witnesses.
18. Whether this second will is characterized as a "will" or a "codicil," its effect as
not revoking the first should be the same. See In re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wash. 2d 833,
847, 176 P.2d 281, 288 (1947) ("whether a particular testamentary instrument is a
codicil or a later will depends upon the intention of the testator or testatrix as
indicated by the words used in the instrument together with the admissible evidence of
the surrounding circumstances"). See also infra text accompanying notes 218-41.
19. See Holt, Revocation by Subsequent Instrument in Alabama: The Strange Case
of Bruce v. Sierra, 20 ALA. L. REV. 66 (1967).

20. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-507 (1977).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.080 (1985) provides:
If, after making any will, the testator shall duly make and execute a second
will, the destruction, cancellation, or revocation of such second will shall not
revive the first will.
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wise) of the second does not revive the first.2 While this effect
of revoking a revoking will would seem counter-intuitivesimply not what the average testator tearing up his second will
would expect-it is the law in a number of states. The theory
is that revocation occurs instantly when the second will is executed, and subsequent destruction or revocation of the second
23
cannot, therefore, revive the first.

Prior to its most recent amendment in 1965, the statute (in
conformity with those in several other jurisdictions) specifically permitted revival if: (1) the testator's intent to revive the
first will "appear[ed] by the terms" of the revocation of the
24
second; or (2) the testator "duly republish[ed]" his first will.

The 1965 amendment to section 11.12.080 omitted both
exceptions.
Given the absolute language of the present statute and the
apparently deliberate omission of the qualifying language
quoted above, it is not only clear that language of "intent to
revive" in a revoking instrument or accompanying a revoking
action will not have that effect, but it is also arguable that wills
revoked by a "second will" 25 now cannot be revived at all,

even by republication. This interpretation, however, would be
difficult to defend. Republication by subsequent will or codicil
is usually nothing more than the equivalent of an incorporation by reference of the earlier instrument in the later.2 6 In
22. Presumably "second will" means "second will that revokes the first expressly

or by implication." This is the same ambiguity as exists in § 11.12.040, discussed supra
notes 17-19 and accompanying text.

23. 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 21.54; In re Estate of Neubert, 9 Wash. 2d
678, 686, 369 P.2d 838, 843 (1962). The two other positions taken by American courts
are, generally: (1) that a revoking instrument is ambulatory and of no effect until the
testator's death, and so its revocation before then always leaves the first will
unrevoked; and (2) that the first will is revived, but only if the testator so intended.
See 2 PAGE ON WILLS supra note 8, § 21.54; ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 92. As will be

seen, the latter is the position taken by Uniform Probate Code § 2-509. The Uniform
Probate Code provision went through many transmutations. When it took the form, at

an early stage, of an anti-revival statute, the rationale given was simply that revival
would require a showing of testator intent, that this would entail admission of parole
evidence, and that such an approach "violates the whole policy" of "requiring
testamentary intent to be established by a properly executed written document."
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UNIFORM PROBATE

CODE § 2-508, Comment at 55 (Fourth Working Draft 1968). The drafters eventually
overcame their reluctance to permit extrinsic evidence.

24. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1405.
25. The statute does not purport to affect revival following revocation of the first
will by physical act, for example, an attempt to erase cancellation lines previously
drawn across the document.
26. ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 90-91; 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 23.5.
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fact, even if the second will has not been revoked, the tradi-

tional view is that a codicil to the first (revoked) will not only
revives the first by republication, but it revokes, or "squeezes
out," the second by implication." Surely, a codicil to the first
will should have this effect if the second has already been
revoked.
What the legislature likely intended when it "streamlined"
the revival statute was to make it clear that the mere act of
revocation of the second, revoking will would not suffice to
revive the first will. Read without any implication from the
previous language, it does not (and should not) imply that
other usual forms of revival (such as republication and reexecution) are no longer available.2"
b.

The "Second Will"

Section 11.12.080 of the Revised Code of Washington prevents a will's revival whenever the testator has executed a
"second will." There is no further definition or explanation of
what constitutes a "second will" for these purposes. At present, the general definition of "will" in section 11.02.005(8)
includes all documents executed "as required by [section]
11.12.020 and includes all codicils."'
Taken literally, this
means that whenever a testator executes a second will or codicil,30 whether or not it purports to revoke any or all of the first
27. See, e.g., In re Wilson's Estate, 397 P.2d 805, 808 (Wyo. 1964); 2 PAGE ON WILLS,
supra note 8, § 21.54 at 586.
28. This intention might be made clear by restoring some language to this effect,
bringing the statute into conformity with the restrictive revival statutes in many other
states. See, e.g., Bird, Revocation of a Revoking Codicil: The Renaissance of Revival in
California, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (1981) [hereinafter "Bird"]; Zacharias & Maschinot,
Revocation and Revival of Wills, 25 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 185, 211-12 (1947) [hereinafter
"Zacharias & Maschinot"]. However, as will be seen, a much more drastic alteration of
the revival statute would be preferable.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020 (1985) contains the formal requirements (writing,
attestation, etc.) of a will.
30. "Codicil" is defined by WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(9) (1985) as any
instrument "validly executed in the manner provided by this title for a will and that
refers to an existing will for the purpose of altering or changing the same ...." Thus
the term "will" literally means "will or codicil," either because a codicil is an
instrument executed as required by § 11.12.020, or because (by § 11.02.005(8) (1985))
"will" expressly "includes all codicils." It is not clear whether the latter ambiguous
phrase is intended to equate wills with codicils, or merely to state that where a will is
referred to, all of its codicils are included in the reference. See the discussion infra
note 36. If so, the addition of the word "its" where indicated would greatly lessen the
confusion.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(48) simply states that "'will' includes codicil
.... It may
.
be significant, as indicated in note 36, infra, that when the anti-revival
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will, the first will is not "revived" by revocation of the second.
Of course, if the second will did not "revoke" the first, there is
no need for its revival.3 But it is unclear whether it was
intended that all "second wills," including all codicils, "revoke"
a superseded will (or will provision) so as to necessitate
revival.3 2
For example, if we assume that a will can be partially or
totally revoked by a second will inconsistent with or partially
modifying the first, but lacking an express revocation clause,3 3
the statute apparently prevents revival of a first will so
revoked. Moreover, if the second "will" is only partially inconsistent with or partially modifies the first, it is in effect only a
codicil, at least if the testator intended both "wills" to stand
together.3 4 Does, then, such a subsequent codicil "revoke" an
inconsistent part of a will so that the destruction of the codicil
does not "revive" that part?
At common law, revocation of a codicil did reinstate the
part of the will which had been altered, because the codicil was
not effective until the testator's death.35 If the testator gave
his entire estate to A and then executed a codicil giving $1,000
to B, the destruction of the codicil would leave standing the
original gift to A. If "second will" in the Washington statute
includes "codicil," then destruction of a codicil leaves revoked
what the codicil had purported to alter. But it is possible to
read "second will" as including only instruments that stand
independently and dispose of the testator's entire estate, and
thus not as including codicils.36 If the legislature indeed wishes
to prevent the "revival" of a part of a will altered by a laterstatute was last amended (1965), § 11.02.005(8) read simply: "'[w]ill'

includes all

codicils."

31. See supra note 22.
32. Cf. Timberlake v. State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trusts, 201 Va. 950,
957, 115 S.E.2d 39, 44 (1960) (no need to "revive" will revoked by subsequently-revoked
instrument).

33. See, e.g., In re Edwall's Estate, 75 Wash. 391, 395, 405, 134 P. 1041, 1042, 1046
(1913); Annot., 59 A.L.R. 2d 11 (1958); ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 87; 1 PAGE ON WILLS,

supra note 8, § 21.42. Again, the revocation statute should make this clear. See § B.1
above.
34. The codicil would have to meet the requirements of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.02.005(9). See text accompanying notes 231-41 infra.
35. See In re Estate of Hering, 166 Cal. Rptr. 298, 300, 108 Cal. App. 3d 88, 92
(1980); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1143, 1153-55 (1966).
36. This is how the early New York and more recent California courts have
interpreted similar statutes. See Bird, supra note 28, at 367-74. The courts apparently
avoided the definitional problem that "will" includes "codicil" by reasoning that this
only means that when the statute refers to a "will," it also refers to all of that will's
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revoked codicil, it should adopt express language to that effect,
as other states have done.3 7 The frequency with which the legislature has made changes in the language of statutes in disregard of the effect of those changes on other statutes, as
illustrated by much of this article, gives one pause before
assuming that the legislature intended the apparent effect of
applying all of the current revival/codicil language together.
However, instead of advocating the addition of clarifying language to the anti-revival statute, I believe a totally different
approach should be taken to the problem of revival.
c. A Better Approach to Revival
While some clarifying language would make the present
anti-revival statute more certain, it might be better to abandon
altogether the present statute.
A cogent argument can be made in favor of the "automatic
revival" approach of the common law.3" As stated earlier, the
present statute is counter-intuitive. A lay testator who revokes
his first will by making an inconsistent gift in a second will,
and who then tears up the second, would most probably and
most logically believe that his first will, no longer burdened by
the now-extinct second will, stood as before. 9 Only a little less
likely is the case of the testator who has revoked his first will
codicils; therefore a "second will" simply means "a second will and that will's codicils,"
rather than "a second will or codicil." Id.
Although the New York and California statutes apparently did not have the
additional language found in present WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(8) (1985), which

includes in "will" all instruments executed with testamentary formalities, neither did
Washington have that additional provision when § 11.12.080 was enacted:

former

§ 11.02.005(8) (1965) stated simply that " '[w]ill' includes all codicils." See supra note 30.
Moreover, at that time the distinction between "will" and "codicil" had (and may still
have) considerable significance. See text accompanying notes 231-41. It is thus unclear
whether the legislature originally intended to exclude codicils from the amended
section 11.12.080, and if so whether it intended to alter the meaning of that section to
include them when it later amended section 11.02.005(8). The latter at least seems

doubtful.
One early review of revival statutes declared flatly that the (former) Washington
statute permits revival only of the "entire first will," because "partial revival is not
mentioned." Zacharias & Maschinot, supra note 28 at 142. By this reasoning, codicils
were not contemplated by the original revival statute at all.
37. See, e.g., the New York statute, which refers to a subsequent will that "revokes
or alters" the first will. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.6 (McKinney 1981).
38. See ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 92 at 475.
39. "It is natural, however, for one unfamiliar with the technicalities of the law to

assume that any will which he has properly executed will be effective so long as it is
the only will which he leaves on his death." Ferrier, Revival of a Revoked Will, 28
CALIF. L. REV. 265, 273 (1940) [hereinafter "Ferrier"].
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by an express revocation clause in a second will. 40 (The testa-

tor who wished to revoke the second without reviving the first
could do so by expressly revoking the first as well.) The automatic revival approach seems particularly desirable when
applied to a codicil that merely modifies, without expressly
revoking, a part of the will. 41 As one court vividly expressed

the problem:
Indeed, for one to meet the Grim Reaper with an intact will
in his hand, which conflicts with no testamentary instrument then in existence, is, to say the least, a paradoxical
approach to an intestate demise.4 2
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the testator may
have forgotten about his prior will, or have intended to die
43
intestate despite his being in possession of the first will.

Although this criticism has little if any application to such
cases as the true codicil, which expressly refers to and modifies
the first will, experience in other jurisdictions has demonstrated the difficulty of attempting to apply different revival
rules for "wills" and "codicils."' 4 4 A separate rule for codicils
would also doubtless raise the distinction between wills and
codicils-already riddled with technicalities in Washington-to
40. As stated by the Virginia Supreme Court:
If a testator... puts a revocation provision in a will which he knows he may
change at pleasure and which he knows will not be effective until he dies, it
would seem to be wholly illogical to say that if he afterwards destroyed the
will with intent to revoke it, he did not thereby destroy all of it, but that,
regardless of his intention, the revocation clause, although without physical
form or existence, remained alive and vital with power to destroy all the wills
he had ever written.
Timberlake v. State-Planters Bank of Commerce and Trusts, 201 Va. 950, 957, 115
S.E.2d 39, 44 (1960).
One authority takes the position that, at least in such a case of express revocation,
the lay testator would expect his first will to remain revoked. 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra
note 8, § 21.54 at 443. It is, of course, just such disagreement and uncertainty in the
speculation as to "usual expectations" that makes proper formulation of an absolute
rule such as § 11.12.080 so difficult.
41. See Ferrier, supra note 39, at 275. Interestingly, the original Uniform Probate
Code proposal for a liberalized revival statute specifically required "clear and
convincing evidence" of the testator's intent to revive, unless the second instrument
was a codicil revoking the first by inconsistency, in which event the evidentiary burden
was on the party asserting lack of intent to revive. National Conference on
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, Uniform Probate Code Section 2-508,
Reporter's Note at 55 (Fourth Working Draft, 1968).
42. Poindexter v. Jones, 200 Va. 372, 383-84, 106 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1958).
43. 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 21.54 at 443; Bird, supra note 28, at 377.
44. See Bird, supra note 28.
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new heights of absurdity.4 5 All in all, it seems preferable to
accept the occasional inadvertently-revived will. At least one
can be assured that the earlier will was at one time an expression of the testator's wishes; 46 and in any event, wherever possible the law favors constructions that avoid intestacy.
In the alternative, a compromise position could be adopted
that attempts to take into account the intent of the testator in
revoking the second will. The statute would create a presumption of revival (or non-revival), rebuttable by evidence-intrinsic or extrinsic-of a contrary intent. This is the approach of
the Uniform Probate Code,4" and it has been adopted in many
other states.4 9 Furthermore, it is a variation on the Washington statute as it existed before 1965.50 This approach has the
obvious appeal of eliminating the inflexibility of a rigid rule of
either automatic revival or automatic non-revival, and of taking into account what the testator actually intended by his act
of revocation.
The primary criticism of such a rule is that, to the extent
it permits admission of extrinsic evidence of intent, there is a
danger of fraud and false testimony.5 1 To some extent, this
danger can be alleviated by imposition of a high, "clear, cogent,
and convincing" standard of proof.5 2 But even if there is no
way to achieve both flexibility and absolute safety from
fraud, 3 there are factors that favor the admission of extrinsic
45. See the discussion of the definition of "codicil" infra, text accompanying notes
231-41.
Nor would it be a good idea for the statute to distinguish express from implied
revocations. Not only would this exalt the happenstance of form over substance, it
would do so in a context which would still be counter-intuitive for the lay testator.
46. See Ferrier, supra note 39, at 272-73.
47. 2 PAGE ON WILlS, supra note 8, § 30.14.
48. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-509.

49. 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 21.55 at 444; ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 92 at
475-76.
50. See text accompanying note 24.
51. See, e.g., 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 21.54 at 443; Bird, supra note 28, at
377. The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code were themselves torn between
certainty and flexibility, with the latter finally prevailing. Bird, supra note 28, at 378.
Of course, this same conflict between an absolute rule and permitting extrinsic
evidence of intent arises in many areas of probate law, including others discussed in
this article. Each should be decided on its own particular merits, in context, and not
by a general position of admission or exclusion for all circumstances.
52. See note 145 and accompanying text. See also the early draft of the Uniform
Probate Code draft quoted in Note 41, supra.
53. "No rule can be worked out which will avoid the dangers of oral evidence on
the one hand and which will give effect to the actual intention of the testator in the
particular case, on the other." 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 21.54 at 443.
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evidence in this situation.
As a general matter, even if extrinsic evidence is not
admitted to prove the testator's intent, under the present statute it is already admissible to prove that the testator did
indeed execute a revoking second will, and then destroyed it,
leaving his first will revoked. Here the opportunity for fraud
is at least as great as, if not greater than, that accompanying
the issue of intent.-4 Moreover, the admission of extrinsic evidence has ample precedent in present procedure when the second will was revoked by physical act. Under the Uniform
Probate Code, if the revocation of the second will is by physical
act, either the circumstances of revocation or the declarations
of the testator (at the time or thereafter) are admissible to
indicate an intent to revive the first will. 5 This is in keeping
with the general policy of admitting extrinsic evidence of revocation by physical act because such an act is inherently ambiguous regarding the testator's intention.' Extrinsic evidence is
commonly admitted to show that the testator's intent was
"conditional" only and therefore the doctrine of dependent relative revocation should apply to nullify the revocation.5 7 Thus,
if the evidence shows that a testator revoked his second will
under the mistaken belief that he was reviving his first, unaware that an anti-revival statute would prevent such a result,
dependent relative revocation can be invoked to nullify the
conditional ("dependent") revocation of the second will, leaving it intact.5 8 The better use of that evidence (where applicable) is to revive the first will-the testator's actual intentrather than return to the conditionally-revoked second will,
54. See, e.g., Ferrier, supra note 39, at 272; Bird, supra note 28, at 377. As one
court has stated: "Under such a rule the most solemn and deliberate will of a testator
that he saw the testator
may be refused probate on the testimony of a witness ....
write and sign a later will which revoked the will now proffered." Timberlake v. StatePlanters Bank of Commerce and Trusts, 201 Va. 950, 957, 115 S.E.2d 39, 44 (1960).
This prospect is especially troubling when viewed against the Washington law of
lost wills. Despite the strictness of the lost wills statute (WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.070)
regarding proof of a lost will's contents, apparently in Washington a lesser standard of
proof will suffice to prove that the lost will revoked a prior will. See In re Neubert's
Estate, 59 Wash. 2d 678, 686, 369 P.2d 838, 843 (1962).
55. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-509(a).
56. See ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 88 at 454-59; 2 PAGE ON WILIs, supra note 8,
§ 21.57 at 447.
57. Id; Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Medical Fdn., 276 So.2d 661, 667-68 (Miss. 1973).
58. See, e.g., In re Estate of Album, 18 Wis.2d 340, 118 N.W.2d 919 (1963). Of
course, the doctrine should be applied only where there is reason to believe the
testator would have preferred the second will to stand rather than die intestate.
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which is merely the testator's assumed preference if his actual
59
intent (the first will) cannot be carried out.

As for a written revocation of the second will by a third,
the Uniform Probate Code limits evidence of intent to revive
to that contained in the third will itself.60 There may be some
theoretical justification for this distinction. Some jurisdictions
do not permit dependent relative revocation where the revocation was in writing, because there is not the "inherent ambiguity" of a physical act to permit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence.6 1 No Washington court, however, appears to have
taken this position. But whatever the theoretical parallel to
physical revocation, the instance of the third will revoking the
second, where the third contains express language of intent to
revive the first, is really an instance of republication, or at
least incorporation by reference of the first will into the third.
As set out above in detail, this probably is still permissible
under the present Washington statute (although here it would
be accomplished by one document instead of two). If it is not
permissible, it should be.
While an argument can be made for admitting extrinsic
evidence even in the case of a written revocation,6 2 it is largely
a moot point. If the third will contains a revocation clause, it
likely will be one that revokes "all prior wills and codicils"the standard opening to a modern will-and thus revokes the
first will as well as the second. If the third expressly revokes
the second only, and is not totally inconsistent with the first,
this singling out of the second without affecting the first would
seem to be a sufficient manifestation that the first was
intended to be revived. If, finally, the third merely revoked the
second by inconsistency, chances are good that the third is
either inconsistent with the first as well, or that it largely
repeats the latter's provisions and so in effect "revives" them.
This leaves only the question of whether the "presumption" in the absence of sufficient extrinsic evidence of intent
59. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-508, Comment at 97 (Third Working Draft 1967), quoted

in Bird, supra note 28, at 379-80.
60. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-509(b).

61. See Crosby, 276 So. 2d at 667-68.
62. For example, a revocation of a second will without mention of whether this
also is meant to revive a still-existing first will might be considered analogous to an
ambiguous provision; extrinsic evidence is generally admissible to resolve ambiguities.

See, e.g., In re Estate of Torando, 38 Wash. 2d 642, 645, 228 P.2d 142, 144 (1951).
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should be one of revival or non-revival; or, put otherwise,
whether the burden of proof by extrinsic evidence should be
on the proponent of revival or of non-revival. Logically, it
would seem best to presume what we believe the usual testator
would have intended. While I have argued that the lay testator
would expect revocation of a revoking will to result in revival
of the prior will (especially if the revoking "will" was a codicil), we have seen that this is at least a debatable point.6"
Interestingly, the Uniform Probate Code presumes non-revival,
despite the apparent opinion of at least some of the drafters
that an expectation of revival would be the norm.' Obviously,
there are other factors that can enter the debate.
Probably the best reason for the Uniform Probate Code
position is that it is the closest to the restrictive (or anti-) revival statutes adopted in many states. It is a far smaller jump
from no revival at all--or revival only upon republication-to
revival only upon proof of the testator's intent, than to nonrevival only upon such proof. 5 Also, those states already permitting proof of intent had generally taken the more restrictive position. 6 Clearly, those who consider revival of a will by
extrinsic evidence of intent to "violate the whole policy"
behind the formal requirements of execution 6 7 would view
with even less favor a rule that permits revival without any
evidentiary showing at all.
In my opinion, the most important step is to repeal the
strict, totally inflexible anti-revival statute. Whatever compromise emerges to replace it-from the Uniform Probate Code
version to automatic revival-will be a distinct improvement.
C. Abatement
1.

The Common-Law Scheme

Abatement is the process whereby testamentary gifts are
63. See supra note 40.
64. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
§ 2-508, Comment at 97 (Third Working Draft 1967), quoted

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE

in Bird, supra note 28, at 380.
65. Many of the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code also favored a rigid antirevival statute, which in fact was in the draft of the Code prior to its final version. See,
e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-509 (Fifth Working Draft 1969). The final version was thus a

compromise that came closest to their position as well.
66. See, e.g., 2 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 21.54; Zacharias & Maschinot, supra
note 28.
67. See supra note 23.
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reduced, according to some scheme of priorities, in order to
make up some insufficiency in the payment of other obligations of the estate. At common law, and in most American
jurisdictions, the order of priority for abatement is determined
by the type of gift in question. Intestate property, which was
not passed by the will, abates first; residuary gifts abate next;
general gifts ("$10,000 to Uncle John") follow; and finally, specific gifts ("My blue Cadillac to Cousin Fred") abate last.
Demonstrative gifts ("$5,000 to Bill, to be paid from proceeds
of my IBM stock if available, otherwise from general funds")
usually abate together with specific gifts." Thus, if it is necessary to raise funds to pay the estate's taxes, property will be
sold and gifts eliminated according to the abatement scheme:
If all of the intestate and residuary property is exhausted, general legatees will lose their gifts next, and specific (together
with demonstrative) legatees will lose nothing until all other
sources of funds are first applied. Within a type of gift, abatement is usually ratable.6 9 The statutory scheme of abatement is
not mandatory; it may be changed by express provisions in the
will.

70

Until modern times, it was commonly the rule that personalty abated before realty of whatever classification. The
modern trend is away from this distinction,7 1 and as will be
seen, it has been abolished in Washington.
The common-law scheme has the weight of history and
familiarity behind it, as well as some degree of logic. However,
in many instances the most important beneficiary of a testator,
such as a spouse, will be the residuary beneficiary, while relatively unimportant beneficiaries are given general or specific
gifts of money or property. For this reason, it is important that
a testator be apprised of the possibility of abatement, and that
his wishes in this regard (if they differ from the statutory
scheme) be expressed in the will. This circumstance demonstrates also that the court should have some flexibility to alter
the statutory abatement scheme when and if it clearly appears
that the testator intended otherwise.
68. See generally ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 136; 6 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8,
ch.53; see also UNIFOmV PROBATE CODE § 3-902(a) (1978).

69. 6 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 53.4.
70. Id, at § 53.2.
71. See ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 136; 6 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 53.4.
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The Washington Statutory Scheme

Washington, unfortunately, has one of the most confusing
abatement schemes one can imagine, due in large part to a
series of amendments over the years that have left the law in
disarray. The statutory language is confusing or ambiguous,
there is little consistency from section to section, and the relevant sections themselves are scattered throughout Title 11.72
Even if nothing is done to change the thrust of the statute,
something must be done to clarify and consolidate its language.
Apparently, Washington generally follows the commonlaw priorities set out above, with some exceptions. (I say
"apparently," because in several respects it is difficult to ascertain just what is intended, as will be seen.) However, the statute also appears to draw a distinction between priority of
disposition (what property is sold first) and priority of liability
(what property, or which beneficiary, bears the ultimate financial burden): while some statutes are directing sale or other
disposition of certain types of property, others require contribution from those whose property remains."3
Some of the problems with the statute are related to terminology. For example, code sections vary as to whether they
speak in terms of "sale," "liability," or, more vaguely, "appropriation" of property. One contribution statute refers to property of the estate "sold" or "taken" to pay expenses,7 4 while
another refers to gifts "taken in execution" for payment,7"
although it seems unlikely that different classes of property
were intended. Such variations and inconsistencies in language
make interpretation of the provisions as an integrated scheme
quite difficult.
Another major inconsistency is the priority of real over
personal property. Originally, the code required the exhaustion of personal property before real property could be sold. 76
This requirement was seemingly removed in 1917, 77 but courts
72. Most of the relevant sections are in WASH. REV. CODE § 11.56 (1985). Compare,
however, such other sections as WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.200-210 (1985) (contribution
among devisees and legatees, and enforcement of that contribution).
73. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.56.170 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.200-210
(1985).
74. WASH. REV. CODE
75. WASH. REV. CODE

§ 11.56.170.
§ 11.12.200.

76. See [1854] Wash. Terr. Laws,
77. 1917 Wash. Laws § 135.

§§

100, 103, 104, 111, 123.
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continued to apply it, 78 probably because the legislature
neglected to remove the requirement from other parts of the
statute in which it appeared. 79 The requirement was expressly
laid to rest again in 1965, in section 11.56.015 of the Revised
Code of Washington; ° but again the legislature failed to
change corresponding provisions, specifically section 11.56.140,
which still appears to give priority to real property."' (It has
also been pointed out 82 that while the distinction between
realty and personalty has been abolished with respect to sale
or other disposition of property, this may be a very different
question from that of abatement, which concerns the type of
property that is primarily liable for the debts.) Obviously the
legislature should clarify this point once and for all, to make it
clear that real and personal property are treated identically
with respect to all matters of abatement, absent a contrary
intention of the testator.
Another problem with the abatement statutes is simply
one of ambiguity or uncertainty of language. For example, section 11.56.150 provides that if the provision made by the will
"or the estate appropriated" is insufficient to pay estate obligations, the part of the estate "not... disposed of by the will, if
any," is appropriated for that purpose. Apart from the question of what is meant by the phrase "or the estate appropriated,"8 3 the phrase "not disposed of by the will" has caused
difficulty. While it would appear to mean, at least literally,
intestate property, it has been interpreted as meaning property
passing under the residuary clause of the will, which of course
78. See, e.g., In re Estate of Machlied, 60 Wash. 2d 354, 357, 374 P.2d 164, 166
(1962).
79. See, e.g., 1917 Wash. Laws ch. 156, § 135 p. 682; REM REV. STAT. § 1505 (1932).
80. See Stewart & Steincipher, ProbateReform in Washington, 39 WASH. L. REV.

873, 880 (1965).
81. This whole sequence of events is set out in a nutshell in Fletcher, Adapting the
Uniform ProbateCode to Washington MaritalProperty Law, 7 GONZ.L. REV. 261, 290

n.115 (1970) [hereinafter "Fletcher"].
82. Id.
83. The phrase refers back to a section no longer in the code, which originally
provided:
§ 124. If the testator shall make provision by his will, or designate the estate
to be appropriated for the payment of his debts, the expenses of
administration, or family expenses, they shall be paid according to the
provision of the will, and out of the estate thus appropriated, so far as the
same may be sufficient.

1 Wash. Sess. Acts § 124, p. 345 (1854). The present statute has no general provision
for testator adjustment of the statutory scheme, although it does sanction it indirectly.
See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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is indeed "disposed of by the will." 4 If the legislature intended
an instruction that residuary gifts abate before others, it certainly could have said so directly.
As for general and specific gifts, one section directs sale of
realty generally devised instead of that specifically devised,
unless "it appears necessary" to sell the latter.s The concept
of "necessity" is not further defined, although, as will be seen
in another section, it refers to testator intention.
Having directed none too clearly that residuary gifts (or
intestate property, or both) abate first, and specific realty
abates last, the legislature proceeds to direct that the entire
estate is liable for expenses, "except that specific devises or
legacies may be exempted, if it appears to the court necessary
to carry into effect the intention of the testator. ' '8 If testator
intention is removed and specific gifts are "exempt," we have
what approximates the common-law scheme: residuary gifts
abate first, specific gifts last, leaving general gifts in the middle. Demonstrative gifts are not mentioned, so it is unclear
whether they abate with general or specific gifts. One
assumes, of course, that the "exemption" of specific gifts lasts
only until all others are exhausted. But the matter of testator
intention then must be factored in again. The testator who
does not state his intention seems to risk the possibility that a
probate court will (or will not) find such intention and exempt
(or not exempt) his specific gifts from abatement. This is the
reverse of the usual scheme, which presumes that such gifts
abate last but allows for alteration according to the testator's
expressed (or clearly implied) intent. While Washington courts
have found an intention to exempt specific gifts (and thus to
follow the traditional scheme) quite readily, 7 the burden
should be reversed and the presumption should be with the
usual approach, not against it.
Even assuming a straightforward order of abatement, the
84. In re Estate of Cloninger, 8 Wash. 2d 348, 352-53, 112 P.2d 139, 141-42 (1941).
See J. Steincipher ed., WASHINGTON PROBATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 394 (1966).
See also, In re Schiffner's Estate, 174 Wash. 134, 140, 24 P.2d 434, 436 (1933) (property
passing under the residuary provision of a will is not otherwise disposed of, and is
subject to a widow's homestead claim).
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.56.050 (1985). The statute does not mention personal
property, probably because at the time it was enacted all personal property abated
before any real property.

86. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.56.160 (1985).
87. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hickman, 41 Wash. 2d 519, 528, 250 P.2d 524, 529
(1952).
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present provisions for contribution make the result far from
certain. Section 11.56.170 requires that when the testator's
estate "given by any will" has been sold to pay debts and
expenses, all devisees and legatees are liable for contribution
to those whose bequests were taken. No exemption for specific, or any other, gifts is mentioned. Of course, if a legatee
has escaped loss of his gift because of its priority of abatement,
but then has to contribute to those whose lower-priority gifts
were taken, we have a priority of sale but not a priority of liability. In effect, there is no abatement scheme at all.
As if to complicate matters still further, section 11.12.200
provides that if the testator shall "give any chattel or real
estate" by will, and the same is "taken in execution for the
payment of the testator's debts," all other beneficiaries must
contribute a proportionate part of their share of the estate.
Here is what appears to be a contribution statute limited to the
reimbursement of specific gifts only. (Again, general and
demonstrative gifts are not mentioned.) While it would be useful only where specific gifts have been sold out of order
(because if they are sold last, there will be nothing left from
which other beneficiaries can reimburse the specific legatees),
at least it is consistent with the general scheme. This is how
the appellate courts seem to have interpreted the contribution
statutes, in that they have largely ignored them and have not
attempted to reimburse residuary legatees whose gifts have
been taken ahead of those of specific legatees."8
3.

Possible Solutions

The easiest and most straightforward solution to the
problems of ambiguity and inconsistency set out above would
be an adoption of the basic common-law abatement scheme,
with necessary modifications for Washington circumstances.
Not only does the common-law hierarchy have the imprimatur
of history and familiarity, which are significant factors in the
area of probate, but it is close to the present Washington abatement scheme. The Uniform Probate Code 9 adopts the common-law order of abatement, without distinction between
realty and personalty. It treats demonstrative gifts as specific
88. See Id.; In re Estate of Hickman, supra; In re Estate of Cloninger, 8 Wash. 2d
348, 112 P.2d 139 (1941). This interpretation is by implication only, as the cases do not
refer to the matter of contribution at all.
89. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-902 (1977).
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to the extent charged on an available fund, and as general to
the extent such a fund fails. It also provides for adjustment
according to testator intent, either express or implied,' and it
recognizes contribution only for preferred gifts sold out of
order.
The basic common-law plan of the Uniform Probate Code
would need to be modified at least to take into account such
questions as abatement between community and separate property. The Code itself addresses the issue by substituting a ratable abatement of community property-apportionment
according to relative value in the estate.9 1 One commentator
has suggested that abatement should follow substantive law as
to the liability of separate or community property for a particular class of debt, with the common-law scheme applying
within a category.92 He also would adopt some form of the
Uniform Probate Code's system 93 for subjecting certain nonprobate transfers to probate debts and expenses. 94 These particulars are beyond the scope of this article, although they
merit very serious consideration when the legislature reconsiders and reformulates abatement.9 5 For present purposes it
would be a considerable improvement merely to replace the
numerous confusing pronouncements presently on the books
with a simple, if unsophisticated, statement of the statutory
order of abatement and the effect of testator intent as superseding that order.
D.

PartialInvalidity

When a person has committed fraud upon or has exercised
90. While the Code speaks only of following an express order of abatement or
avoiding a defeat of "the testamentary plan or the express or implied purpose of the
devise," the Comment to section 3-902 makes it clear that as a general rule such gifts
as a general devise to a spouse or to a person respecting whom the testator is in loco

parentis should be given priority. It may be that testator preference for such gifts
(and a few others commonly given preference by courts) is sufficiently widespread and
likely that it should be written expressly into the statutory scheme, rather than left to
case-by-case interpretation, with the presumption of priority still subordinate to an

expressed or clearly implied contrary intent.
91.
92.
93.
§ 6-107,
94.

UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-902A.

Fletcher, supra note 81, at 291-93.
Id. at 294. Professor Fletcher refers specifically to UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
relating to multiple party bank accounts.
Fletcher, supra note 81, at 293-95.

95. The latter proposal, of course, is a part of the larger question of the proper
relationship between probate and nonprobate transfers, on which the Uniform Probate
Code has generally taken a very progressive approach.
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undue influence over a testator, sometimes only a part of the
will is affected by the malfeasance, and other parts remain as
they would have been had the fraud or undue influence never
occurred. Assume, for example, a testator who has drafted a
testamentary plan that has not yet been executed and that
excludes his son. The testator's son may unduly influence him
to draft and execute a plan that is identical to his formerly
expressed intention, except for the addition of a gift to the son.
While upon proper evidence a court would and should declare
the gift to the son invalid, it is less clear what should become
of the rest of the will; that is, whether it should be declared
totally invalid (and intestacy result) or whether it should be
held to be partially valid, to the extent it is untainted by the
son's acts. The majority of American jurisdictions permit probate of the part of the will that is not affected by the fraud or
undue influence. 6
Although there is dictum in Washington to the effect that
fraud may invalidate a will "either in whole or in part," 97 in
1952 the supreme court expressed doubt that Washington law
permitted partial invalidity. The court interpreted the two relevant statutes, sections 11.24.01098 and 11.24.040, 9' as reducing
the issue in a will contest to devisavit vel non: the validity or
invalidity of the entire will."o° On the other hand, partial invalidity has been recognized in the context of material alterations to the will.10 1
The minority position disallowing partial invalidity has little to recommend it, at least in a case in which the only evi96. See ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 61; 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, §§ 14.3, 14.8.
97. In re Estate of Bottger, 14 Wash. 2d 676, 701, 129 P.2d 518, 528 (1942).
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.24.010 (1985) provides in part:
Issue shall be made up, tried, and determined... respecting the competency
of the deceased to make a last will and testament, or respecting the execution
by a deceased of such last will and testament under restraint or undue
influence of fraudulent representations, or for any other cause affecting the
validity of such will.
99. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.24.040 (1985) provides that if
... the will is for any reason invalid... the will and probate thereof shall be
annulled and revoked, and thereupon . . . the powers of the executor or
administrator with the will annexed shall cease ....
100. In re Dand's Estate, 41 Wash. 2d 158, 165-66, 247 P.2d 1016, 1021 (1952). The
court did not have to resolve the matter finally, because it determined that under the
circumstances partial invalidity would have been inappropriate in any event. See also
In re Ganjian's Estate, 55 Wash. 2d 360, 362, 347 P.2d 891, 892-93 (1959) (partial
invalidity doctrine rejected where entire will tainted).
101. In re Campbell's Estate, 47 Wash. 2d 610, 616, 288 P.2d 852, 856 (1955) (Dand
was not cited).
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dence of wrongdoing does not touch the remainder of the will
or cast doubt in any way on its validity. In such an instance,
rejecting the entire will not only "throws out the baby with
the bathwater," but possibly leaves the result farther from the
testator's intent than would declaring the entire will valid and
ignoring the misconduct. The minority position has been
strongly criticized, as has the narrow (though arguable) reading of the statute on which it purports to be based. 0 2
The simplest solution would be the addition of the words
"or a part thereof" after "will" at the end of section 11.24.010
and the beginning of section 11.24.040, and "or part" before
"and probate" in the latter section. This should result in clear
adoption of the majority position permitting probate of that
part of a will unaffected by fraud or other impropriety.
III.

"HOLES IN THE STATUTE"

Another category of legislative lapses concerns areas in
which the legislature, more by oversight than by design, has
failed to address a matter at all, or has addressed it in insufficient detail for the guidance of court or practitioner. Some of
these lapses have already caused difficulty; others are still
lurking in the shadows awaiting discovery.
A.

Determining the Applicable Law

Interjurisdictional choice of law problems arise in probate
as well as other fields; but in the world of probate law, temporal choice of law not only appears as well, but it takes on a particular significance because of the long time-frame of a will.
The Washington statutes address both jurisdictional and temporal choice of law, but with respect to the latter, they do so
only in a vague and unsatisfactory way.
1.

Jurisdictional Choice of Law

Washington law provides that, with respect to the mode of
a will's execution, if the will has been executed outside of
Washington, the law of the place of execution or of the testator's domicile controls its validity. 10 3 What the statute does not
102. See, e.g., ATKINSON supra note
L.J. 283, 294 (1923).
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020
execution is intended. As a matter of
elsewhere but no foreign law is proved

5, § 61 at 290; Note, Recent Case Notes, 32 Yale
(1985). Presumably domicile at the date of
procedure, however, if the will was executed
at trial, it will be assumed that the law of the
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seem to cover is the will that was executed inside the state, by
a testator domiciled in some other state. This could easily
occur if, for example, a New York domiciliary testator executed his will while visiting his children in Washington. The
omission creates a curious anomaly not necessarily intended by
the legislature: if that New York testator had executed his will
while visiting his children anywhere else in the world except
Washington, the Washington courts would apply New York
law (or that of the place of execution) to the will; but because
he executed the will in Washington, the law of his domicile
cannot be applied.
The choice of Washington law when a will is executed in
Washington might be understandable as a preference for the
familiar lex fori whenever some connection with the state can
be found. This motivation, however, is inconsistent with the
result where a Washington domiciliary has executed his will
while visiting in New York, in which event New York law
apparently can be applied. A better rule would be to give the
testator a choice of execution- or domiciliary-state law whenever the two diverge. The Uniform Probate Code has such a
provision, and it also extends the choice of law to the place of
abode or nationality, at either the time of execution or the
time of death.1" 4
2.

Temporal Choice of Law

Even if the only jurisdiction involved in the execution of a
will is Washington, there is another potential choice-of-law
problem that can arise: the effect of a change in the law following the date of execution. The law may require, for example,
two witnesses to a will at the time of execution, but be changed
to require three (or only one) before the date of death or probate. Which requirement governs the validity of the will?
If a change in the law occurs after the death of the testator, and therefore after rights have vested or accrued, it is
place of execution is identical with that of Washington. In re Estate of Nelson, 85
Wash. 2d 602, 606, 537 P.2d 765, 769 (1975).
104. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (1969). In In re Chappell's Estate, 124 Wash.
128, 213 P. 684 (1923), the court acknowledged the general desirability of applying to a
will of personalty the law of the decedent's domicile, but (with respect to the validity
of distributive provisions) it applied the law of Washington to a will executed in
Washington by a presumed California domiciliary. However, the court based its
choice-of-law decision on the clear intent of the testator that Washington law apply.
See also Annot., 169 A.L.R. 554 (1947). Choice-of-law rules differ, of course, where real
property is involved.
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clear that the change cannot apply retroactively, and the law
prevailing at the death of the testator applies.' But the result
is less clear if the change in the law occurs between the time of
execution and the time of death. To use the previous example,
let us suppose that the testator executed a will in 1930 and had
it attested by two competent witnesses; that the applicable
Washington statute in 1930 required only two witnesses to validate a will; that in 1990 the legislature changed the law to
require attestation by three witnesses; and that the testator
died in 1991, unaware of the change in the law. Is the will
valid?
The modern majority rule in the above situation is that
absent an indication to the contrary, it is presumed that a will's
validity is unaffected by legislative changes occurring subsequent to its execution, at least with respect to such formalities
as the number of witnesses. °6 This is an extension of the settled rule that a statute will be presumed to apply only prospectively if there is no clear indication that it is to be applied
retroactively. 0 7 It seems to be a salutary approach, requiring
our testator only to comply with the law as it existed at the
time he executed his will, and not voiding his will because of a
change of mind by the legislature some sixty years later, on a
mere matter of form, and without much likelihood that the
testator would have actual notice of the change or its effect on
his will.
Early Washington cases seemed to diverge from the majority rule, or at least left the question open. In Strand v. Stew08
art,1
the court applied the law relating to notice to creditors
in effect at the testator's death, rather than that in effect at
the date of execution.' °9 While the case did not involve the
formalities of execution but only those of the later probate, the
court stated in broad terms that since wills are ambulatory and
remain until the testator's death subject to the will of both the
testator and the legislature, and since a will speaks as of the
date of death and not of execution, the law applicable is that
105. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.99.020 (1985). See In re Estate of Wind, 32 Wash. 2d 64,
69, 200 P.2d 748, 751 (1948); Strand v. Stewart, 51 Wash. 685, 687-88, 99 P. 1027, 1028-29
(1909); In re Estate of Buhakka, 4 Wash. App. 601, 602-03, 484 P.2d 463, 464-65 (1971).
106. See 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 3.4 at 71-72.
107. Id.

See In re Estate of Wind, supra note 105, at 751.

108. 51 Wash. 685, 99 P. 1027 (1909).
109. Id. at 687-88, 99 P. at 1028-29.
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existing at the date of death."' 0 Then in In re Estate of
Ziegner,1 1 the court retroactively applied a statute that automatically revoked a gift to a divorced spouse. The will in that
case had been executed (and a divorce had taken place) before
the passage of the statute. The court cited Strand and professed not to be bound under the circumstances by the general
rule regarding prospective application of statutes. It did, however, make a point of stating that the issue was not one of the
formalities of execution, propriety of witnesses, or other such
matters over which the courts "greatly differ," but instead
went to the "substance" of the will; and it expressly limited its
holding to such cases."1 2 Thus the effect of a change of law on
the formalities of execution and attestation remained
unresolved, and the broad language of Strand remained
unrestricted.
The only statute that addresses the question of the applicability of Title 11 is section 11.99.010, which states that the procedures of Title 11 govern "all proceedings in probate brought
after the effective date of the title" and all proceedings "then
pending," except where the court finds that their application
would, in a particular case, "not be feasible or would work
injustice, in which event the former procedure shall apply." If
the exception clause refers to all proceedings, and not just
pending ones, which is not clear from the syntax, a court may
have some flexibility in individual cases; but the general rule
stated is one of total retroactivity of all of Title 11. A similar
provision, rendering retroactive the 1974 amendments to the
Code, is found in section 11.02.080.
The only case to date that interprets section 11.99.010 is In
re Estate of Buhakka.1 3 That case concerned the question
whether a widow could be made an award in lieu of homestead
(under section 11.52.010 of the Revised Code of Washington)
from the decedent's separate property, something allowed by
the statute in effect at the decedent's death, but not by that in
effect at the time of the will's execution. The court seemed to
assume that the statute requires displacement by Title 11 of all
of the law in effect at the date of execution. However, the
court emphasized the beneficial policy furthered by the partic110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
146 Wash. 537, 264 P. 12 (1928).
Id. at 539, 264 P. at 13.
4 Wash. App. 601, 484 P.2d 463 (1971).
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ular statute in issue, and the salutary result of applying it to
cases such as that before it, taking something of a case-by-case
approach. Moreover, the court relied on a precedent, In re
Estate of Wind,:"4 in which the statute in effect at the testator's death was applied, but in preference to one passed after
his death. Not only was there no earlier, date-of-execution
statute involved in Wind, but the court reaffirmed the settled
doctrine that retroactive application requires a clear indication
of legislative intent. 1 5 Finally, the Buhakka court also relied
on a statement in Page on Wills that, as it recognized," 6 refers
to application of the law of the date of death only with respect
to "restrictions on the power of the testator to make some certain type of disposition.""' 7 The question of validity is not such
a restriction.
Whatever may have been the legislature's intention in
promulgating the broad language of section 11.99.010, there is a
need to rethink and clarify the question of temporal choice of
law, as to existing legislation and especially as to any future
changes in the law governing validity of a will. While it may
make good sense to look to the law existing at the time of
death for such questions as spousal rights and creditor protection, or perhaps even the construction of the will's language," 8
the question of validity, and in particular the formalities of
execution, are a different matter. If the requirements for
validity have been increased since the execution of the will," 9
even the most carefully executed will might fail simply
because the testator did not periodically consult an attorney to
ensure that the law had not changed since the date of execution. On the other hand, if the requirements for validity
decrease, a will invalid when executed might become valid if
114. 32 Wash. 2d 64, 69, 200 P.2d 748, 751 (1948).
115. 1&
116. 4 Wash. App. at 602, 484 P. at 464-65.
117. 4 PAGE ON WILLs, supra note 8, § 30.27. An example is a statute governing
restraints on alienation. Id. at note 14.
118. See 4 PAGE ON WILIs, supra note 8, § 30.27, indicating that while the courts
are split on the question, the majority rule favors application of the law of the date of
execution to matters of construction.
119. Even though in recent years most if not all of the changes in the law
respecting formalities of execution have been in the direction of greater liberalization
of those requirements, this need not always be true. In the past there have been
instances of the legislature adding rather than deleting requirements. For example, an
earlier version of WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.020, which now provides that attesting
witnesses must subscribe their names to the will "by [the testator's] direction or
request," contained no such requirement. Code 1881, § 1319.
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the subsequent change were applied. Because in modern times
formal requirements for wills are generally being liberalized
rather than tightened,120 the latter is the more likely circumstance. Here there seems far less reason not to apply the subsequent, validating law, since the testator has fulfilled all that
the legislature now deems necessary for his and society's protection, and there would seldom be unfairness to the testator,
who presumably thought all along that the will was valid. 21
Nevertheless, the majority rule seems to be that in all cases
the law at the date of execution controls. 1 22 This is a reasonable, straightforward approach that might be justified by noting that a testator who did not satisfy the formalities of the
then-current law had no legitimate expectation of validity, and
upon him" by a subseperhaps should not have validity "thrust
23
quent change in legislative thinking.1
In my view, the legislature should specifically state which
law applies to the question of validity, rather than give the
same treatment to the matter as to all other aspects of Title 11,
most of which present somewhat different issues. Among the
24
alternatives is that found in the Uniform Probate Code,
which provides that a will is valid if its formalities comply with
current local law or "with the law at the time of execution" of
the place of execution, domicile, abode, or nationality. This in
effect creates a preference for validity, whether under current
law or that of the date of execution. It recognizes that the ritual of will execution is not a perfect formula, and that more
injustice is likely to occur by restricting the court to the "old"
120. For example, the Uniform Probate Code contains many provisions regarding
execution of wills that are more liberal than their traditional counterparts. See, e.g.,
§ 2-502 (witnesses need not sign in testator's or each other's presence; testator need not

publish will; testator may sign outside of presence of witnesses, with later
acknowledgment; signature need not be at end of will); § 2-503 (only "material
provisions" of holographic will need be in testator's handwriting); § 2-505 (interested
witnesses competent and will not forfeit applicable legacies); § 2-513 (disposition of
certain tangible personal property by informal writing).
121. Indeed, some courts do apply such a distinction, looking to the subsequent
law only where it has reduced the requirements for validity. See 1 PAGE ON WILLS

supra note 8, § 3.5.
122. 1 PAGE ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 3.4.
123. It is even possible that a testator, fully aware that he had not yet fulfilled all
of the formal requirements of validity, had no present intention of doing so and
certainly no expectation that his uncompleted will would later be considered valid
under new, more liberal standards.
124. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (1969).
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or "new" legislature's formula than by allowing for a choice of
either.
Thus, at least two options are available to the Washington
legislature, other than leaving the matter, as at present, for
judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. First, formalities of
execution could be governed by the law in effect at the time of
execution. This would conform to the majority position, avoid
unfairness to testators and their heirs, and provide a fixed, predictable, and easily-applied standard. In the alternative, the
approach of the Uniform Probate Code could be adopted, validating a will if the formalities required by either current or
date-of-execution law were satisfied. Either would be workable, fair, and a definite improvement over the current state of
the law. Finally, either would be subject to alteration in specific statutes by language to that effect. 2 5
B. Effect of Divorce on a Will
Divorce generally ends any direct testamentary relationship between the testator and the divorced spouse. Washington's "post-testamentary spouse statute," section 11.12.050 of
the Revised Code of Washington, revokes a will as to a spouse
following divorce, taking from the divorced spouse any benefits
under the will. Because the statute revokes the will only "as to
the divorced spouse," the will remains valid and effective as to
any other beneficiaries: one deletes the divorced spouse's
share, and divides the rest among the remaining beneficiaries,
or if there are none, among the intestate takers. But here
complications can arise. Consider the following gift under a
typical will:
"I give to my wife Wilma all of my bonds; but if my wife
fails to survive me, I give such property to my friend Fred."
The testator's son is the residuary beneficiary or the intestate
taker of all property not otherwise devised by the will. The
testator and Wilma have been divorced, but Wilma is still alive
at the testator's death; the gift to her is revoked by operation
of law, and she takes nothing. Who takes the bonds?
Clearly, if one follows the literal language of the will, the
125. An example of such language used to limit retroactive effect to a specific date
is found in WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.010, which states in part: "All wills executed
subsequent to September 16, 1940, and which meet the requirements of this section are
hereby validated and shall have all the force and effect of wills executed subsequent to
the taking effect of this section."
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son takes the bonds as undevised property. Since the testator's
wife did in fact "survive" the testator, the contingency upon
which his friend would take (failure of the testator's wife to
survive him) has not occurred. And yet, we cannot help but
wonder whether that is what the testator had in mind when he
made his friend the recipient should his wife not survive; and
our dilemma is increased if we postulate variations in which,
for example, the substitute taker Fred is Wilma's brother or
child by a former marriage, or the intestate taker is a disfavored child intentionally omitted from the will. Should death
and divorce have the same, or different, effects upon such a
contingent gift?
Washington courts faced with this dilemma have done
their best to develop a coherent approach, but ultimately only
legislation can offer a satisfactory resolution. The first case to
address the question, Peiffer v. The Old National Bank &
Union Trust Co.,12 concerned a gift of the testator's entire
estate to his "beloved wife" if she survived him for three
months, and to his son if she did not. The testator's daughter
was expressly disinherited. The testator divorced his spouse,
who then survived him by more than three months. The
divorce revoked the former wife's share by operation of law;
but the effect of that revocation on the son's contingent gift
was unclear. By the literal language of the gift, the former
wife had indeed "survived," defeating the son's contingent gift
and passing one-half of the estate to the disinherited daughter
by intestacy. The court recognized that this result would have
been contrary to the clear intent of the testator, and to avoid
such a result the court focused on the term "beloved wife"
used by the testator: while the ex-wife survived, she did not
survive as his "beloved wife," and therefore the son's gift took
effect.' 2 7 The difficulty with this narrow "terminology"
approach is obvious: if the testator had used his spouse's first
name only, instead of "beloved wife," the court would have
been forced to award half of the estate to the disinherited
daughter, or to find another theory.
In the next case, In re Estate of McLaughlin,28 the testator used the term "she," referring back to a prior naming of his
wife, in the survival clause; and again, following a divorce the
126. 166 Wash. 1, 6 P.2d 386 (1931).
127. I& at 6, 6 P.2d at 388.
128. 11 Wash. App. 320, 523 P.2d 437 (1974).
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former spouse survived the testator. Here, however, the substituted taker was the former wife's son, the testator's stepson,
and the court determined that the testator would not have
wished the stepson to take under the circumstances that
occurred.'2 9 In McLaughlin, the court did not, to its credit,
merely distinguish Peiffer on the basis of the different words
used by the testator, recognizing that this would be a "rather
technical distinction." However, the test the court did apply
was little better: it held that the "plain meaning" of the
"express condition" was that the survival of the former wife
should negate the stepson's gift, and therefore the stepson
could not take. Again the difficulty seems clear: had the former wife happened to predecease the testator, a purely fortuitous circumstance, by the court's reasoning the stepson would
have taken, whether or not this would have been the testator's
intent. (Did the testator favor the stepson on his own merits,
or only because of his closeness to the testator's then-beloved
wife? Was the contingent gift a favor to his wife, or an expression of concern for the stepson?) A subsequent case, In re
° followed McLaughlin on similar facts.
Estate of Harrison,13
Both the "terminology" test of Peiffer and the "plain
meaning" test of McLaughlin are inadequate responses to the
problem raised by the statute, at least to the extent that they
seem to depend upon the vagaries of language or the happenstance of survival. A test merely following the testator's intent
might be desirable, but that intent is often difficult to ascertain, especially when dealing with circumstances that most testators do not (and do not wish to) anticipate.
The easiest solution to the problem is a small addition to
the language of the statute. Following the revocation of any
provisions for a divorced spouse, the statute need only add
that, "except as otherwise provided in the will, property shall
pass as if the former spouse had predeceased the testator."
This is the approach taken by the Uniform Probate Code,' 3 '
and it has the advantage of certainty, at the admitted sacrifice
of some flexibility. However, since the basic provision for revocation upon divorce is absolute and unaffected by the testator's (unexpressed) intent, it does little violence to the scheme
to include the defeat of those gifts conditional upon the
129. Id at 322-23, 523 P.2d at 438-39.
130. 21 Wash. App. 382, 585 P.2d 187 (1978).
131. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1977).
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spouse's survival. More importantly, both effects of divorce
seem to be in keeping with what the average testator would
prefer. If there will be an occasional defeat of a testator's true
intent,1 3 2 at least there will be the opportunity for the testator
to include some other scheme in his will and avoid the statutory choice.13 3
IV.

MATTERS OF POLICY

It is not always, or even usually, by mistake that the legislature promulgates a statute that is found to create difficulties
of interpretation or application. Often the statute represents a
deliberate choice by the drafters based upon their perception
of policy, utility, or other motivation. If in present context the
statute seems either unworkable or counterproductive, or we
can now see that it contains the potential for future difficulty
or unfairness, there is need to reexamine the purpose and pres132. For example, the testator's intent probably would be defeated in a case like
McLaughlin. An alternative approach would be to amend the statute to follow the
testator's intent, to admit extrinsic evidence of that intent if necessary, and to presume
the spouse's death only if a contrary intent cannot be ascertained. Many jurisdictions
have taken an "intent" approach. See, e.g., Porter v. Porter, 286 N.W.2d 649 (Iowa
1979) and cases cited therein. However, this would create the kind of uncertainty and
difficulties of proof that presently characterize the cases in this area. A desire to
disinherit both the spouse and the alternative taker will likely be exceptional; and
presumably, if the statute is amended as suggested in the text, the testator's attorney
will inform him of the consequences of a divorce and can easily draft appropriate
language to fit any contrary desire of the testator. The present language, being silent
on the question, does not alert either the testator or his attorney to the potential
problem.
133. This proposal would also parallel the disclaimer statute, WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.86.050 (1985), which treats disclaimants as if they had predeceased the testator
with respect to the disclaimed interest, unless otherwise provided. At least two states,
Arizona and Utah, take a compromise position in their statutes, treating the former
spouse as predeceased, but also revoking the interests of that spouse's issue who are
not also issue of the testator. 6 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2508 (West 1975); 8A UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-508 (Michie Supp. 1986). It may be that the drafters of these
provisions considered step-children (-issue) of the testator to be the only persons
(other than the former spouse) whom the usual testator would not want to benefit
following divorce. By this scheme, they lose outright gifts as well as those conditioned
on the former spouse's nonsurvival. The former spouse's other relatives (the testator's
"in-laws"), however, are not precluded from taking either outright or as substitute
takers.
These statutes, like the Uniform Probate Code § 2-508 upon which their basic
provisions are modeled, also reinstate the revoked gifts upon the testator's remarriage
to the divorced spouse. This resolves another potential problem that has occasionally
arisen and that a comprehensive rewriting of the Washington statute probably should
address.
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ent implications of that legislative choice. The following are
just such examples.
A.

Proof of Lost Wills: The "Two Witness" Requirement

Section 11.20.070 of the Revised Code of Washington is the
"lost wills" statute."' It provides that proof of a lost or
destroyed will may be made by following certain procedures,
all of them obviously designed to ensure that a will that cannot
now be produced did in fact contain the language that the proponent of the will suggests. The requirements are quite strict,
as they should be in a situation fraught with opportunities for
fraud or mistake.
The lost will requirements have always given courts and
legislatures trouble. For example, the common requirement
that the will be shown to have been "in existence" at the time
of the testator's death or "fraudulently destroyed" before his
death often led (in Washington and elsewhere) to the anomalous situation in which a will was destroyed by the testator
without an intention to revoke, 135 and so was neither "in
(physical) existence" nor "fraudulently (without the testator's
knowledge) destroyed." As a result, a will that was perfectly
valid and unrevoked could not be probated, despite adequate
proof of its contents.1 3 6 Eventually the legislature addressed
the problem and changed the statute, but not until at least one
Washington case had reached the unfortunate result
indicated.1

7

Perhaps we can head off another highly questionable
result before a court is forced to reach it. One requirement for
proving a lost will is that the will's provisions must be "clearly
134. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.070 (1985) provides:
Upon the death of a decedent, a one-half share of the community property

shall be confirmed to the surviving spouse, and the other one-half share shall
be subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent, or shall descend as
provided in chapter 11.04 RCW. The whole of the community property shall
be subject to probate administration for all purposes of this title, including the
payment of obligations and debts of the community, the award in lieu of
homestead, the allowance for family support and any other matter for which
the community property would be responsible or liable if the decedent were
living.
135. For example, the testator might have had only a conditional intent to revoke,
and the condition being unfulfilled, the revocation would have been ineffective. This
circumstance invokes the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.

See, e.g., In

re

Estate of Kerckhof, 13 Wash. 2d 469, 125 P.2d 284 (1942); Atkinson, supra note 5, § 88.
136. Kerckhof, 13 Wash. 2d at 475-484, 125 P.2d at 286-90.
137. Id-
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'
and distinctly proved by at least two witnesses."138
As interpreted over the years, this requirement is mandatory, and the
court cannot waive it no matter how great the quantity or
weight of any other evidence of the will's contents. 13 9 The
"witness" referred to "means a person who is sworn and testifies in a cause and not a document or paper merely,"' 4 ° and
each witness must testify to the contents from personal knowledge, in the manner of witnesses generally.' 4 ' It is this rigid
requirement of live witnesses and personal knowledge that
seems misplaced and is a potential source of injustice.
It should first be noted that the "two witness" requirement is given a somewhat liberal interpretation where this
4
seems appropriate. For example, in In re Estate of Gardner,"
the only witnesses to a lost will were the named executor, who
had read and could recall it, and the wife of the testator's
nephew. The nephew, however, was the one responsible for
fraudulently destroying the will, having taken it from its custodian and shown it to his wife, who scanned it looking for her
own name before the nephew burned it. The court obviously
did not want the nephew to accomplish the very result he had
sought because of the unavailability of two witnesses to the
contents. It thus held that the wife's somewhat vague testimony, aided by her only slightly clearer pretrial deposition,
was sufficiently supportive of the executor's recollection on
key elements to satisfy even the "clear and distinct proof"
requirement of the statute. 4 The court also quoted a statement that the witnesses need not be able to testify to the will's
"exact language but only to the substantive provisions."' 44
Suppose, however, that the only evidence of the lost will's
contents were the testimony of one witness who had seen and
now recalled the contents, and of another witness who had
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.20.070 (1985).

139. In re Estate of Peters, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 858, 264 P.2d 1109, 1115 (1953); Harris
v. Harris, 10 Wash. 555, 561, 39 P. 148, 151 (1895).
140. Harris,10 Wash. at 562, 39 P. at 151.
141. In re Estate of Peters, 43 Wash. 2d at 858, 264 P.2d at 1115; In re Estate of
Calvin, 188 Wash. 283, 289, 62 P.2d 461, 463 (1936); In re Estate of Needham, 70 Wash.
229, 234, 126 P. 429, 431 (1912).
142. 69 Wash. 2d 229, 417 P.2d 948 (1966).
143. Id at 232, 237, 417 P.2d at 950, 953. The court referred to the Illinois rule
permitting proof by only "slight evidence" if the will is opposed by the person who
fraudulently destroyed it.
144. Id at 236, 417 P.2d at 953 (quoting In re Estate of Gabriel, 59 Ill. App. 2d 388,
394, 210 N.E.2d 597, 601 (1965)).
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seen it, had placed a copy in his safe at the time, and could now
produce that copy but could not state the terms from memory.
Such evidence would seem to be not only "clear and distinct,"
but if anything better than the distant memories of two witnesses alone. It even satisfies the evidentiary "best evidence
rule," provided the original is sufficiently proven to be unavailable, whereas under traditional American doctrine the oral tes14 5
timony alone would not.

The supreme court was almost faced with this situation in
In re Estate of Auritt.1 46 The proponents of the lost will submitted a carbon copy of the will together with the testimony of
the attorney who drafted it and his stenographer that from
personal knowledge they could state that the document was in
fact an exact copy of the will. Because of the allegation of personal knowledge of the contents, the court was able to distinguish cases in which a copy had not had such testimonial
support. 4 7
The question is whether such personal knowledge of the
contents ought to be required where some other form of
authentication, which might be even more reliable, is available.
For example, the copy might be proven to have been initialed
by the decedent, made simultaneously with or immediately
after the original, placed in safekeeping by a custodian able to
account for its whereabouts until removed from its repose and
submitted to the court, and at no time subject to an opportunity for alteration of its contents. In fact, this is precisely the
sort of testimony one would expect when submitting a copy of
a will. Most wills are drawn by an attorney; the original is
given to the testator, while a copy is kept in the attorney's file.
What would be unusual would be the attorney's (or his secretary's) ability to recall from memory (of their "personal
knowledge") the substance of each such will drafted over the
period of several decades. When such a witness later does so
testify after having seen a copy, it is doubtful that the basis for
the testimony is always genuine present recollection, as
opposed to certainty that the copy must in fact be correct. The
emphasis should be on the quality of the evidence, and not
upon a rigid requirement of a particular type of evidence,
145. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 721 (3d ed. 1985).
146. 175 Wash. 303, 27 P.2d 713 (1933).
147. Id at 306, 27 P.2d at 715. See also, In re Estate of Peters, 43 Wash. 2d 846, 85661, 264 P.2d 1109, 1114-17 (1953).
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which may in a given instance be less probative than other evidence that is available.
One possible approach is that taken in New York. There a
statute specifically permits an authenticated copy of the will to
substitute for one of the required two witnesses to the will's
contents. 148 An alternative, sometimes reached by interpretation of a New York-type statute, is to require either two witnesses to the contents or an authenticated copy plus one
witness either to the contents or to the authenticity of the
copy.1 49 The problem with either such approach is the same as
with the present Washington statute: a mechanical, "this-wayor-not-at-all" formula is adopted that, if it cannot be fulfilled
because of circumstances beyond the testator's (or anyone's)
control, absolutely prevents probate of the will.
Far better would be a recognition that what is at stake
here is simply an evidentiary requirement, which should be
resolved as are other similar problems. We want to be as certain as possible that the purported lost will not only existed
and was lost, but had the provisions that its proponent alleges.
If that is our purpose, our solution should be couched in terms
of certainty, not mechanics.
The mechanical approach, in fact, offers little assurance of
certainty in many cases in which it would be applied. As indicated, while a witness might purport to recall all of the salient
terms of the lost will 20 years after having once read the document, more often than not the memories of even two such witnesses, no doubt "refreshed" in the meanwhile by a variety of
extrajudicial methods, would be of questionable reliability.1 5 °
In the usual case in which we desire greater certainty on an
issue, we raise the standard of proof to a level that gives us sufficient assurance that a finding will not be made lightly. Thus
in Washington probate law, the usual standard for invalidating
a will for undue influence is that the evidence be "clear,
148. N.Y. SURROGATE'S COURT PROCEDURE LAW, § 1407 (McKinney, 1986) (for a

detailed analysis of this statute and the substitution of witnesses, see In re Estate of
Kleefeld, 55 N.Y.2d 253, 433 N.E.2d 521, 448 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1982)).
149. See the discussion in In re Estate of Kleefield, 433 N.E. 2d 521, 525-31 (1982)
(dissenting opinion of Meyer, J.).

150. Compare, e.g., Kahn v. Hoes, 35 N.Y.S. 273 (1895) ("After a lapse of seventeen
years he shows the same remarkable recollection of details, even to the phraseology of
the will and the physical appearance of the draft which is in evidence, which... tends
to deepen rather than allay doubts which have arisen respecting the facts."), quoted in
In re Estate of Kleefeld, 55 N.Y. 2d at 262, 433 N.E. 2d at 527, n.2.
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cogent, and convincing,""'5' rather than simply "more probable
than not," the ordinary civil standard. A similar standard
would help to ensure that a finding as to the contents of a lost
will would require more than the usual preponderance of evidence, but would be based on particularly cogent evidence of a
quality somewhere between a preponderance and "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
If some objective criteria were still deemed desirable, as a
"guide" to the trial court, the statute might be amended to
require, for example, the following: "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence of the contents of the will, consisting at least
in part of either the testimony of a witness familiar with the
contents, or an authenticated copy of the will." Such a statute
would seem to give a court the flexibility of accepting one of
the two evidentiary alternatives alone, or requiring more when
neither is sufficiently convincing by itself. While the statute
would retain some rigidity by requiring a particular type of evidence, it would be a rare case in which "clear, cogent, and convincing" evidence could be produced in the absence of either a
copy of the will or oral testimony of one with personal knowledge of its contents.
B.

The PretermittedHeir Statute

Washington's pretermitted heir statute, section 11.12.090 of
the Revised Code of Washington, needs both a reformation of
the ambiguity of its present language and a re-evaluation of
the statute's overall approach to accomplishing its ends. For
convenience, both aspects of the problem are covered in the
present context. I will deal first with a matter merely of ambiguity, then with one of ambiguity exacerbated by a questionable policy, and finally with that policy itself, proposing a
wholly new statute.
It is helpful first to set out the statute and its basic interpretation, before discussing both in more detail. Section
11.12.090 provides as follows:
If any person make his last will and die leaving a child or
children or descendants of such child or children not named
or provided for in such will, although born after the making
151. See, e.g., In re Estate of Reilly, 78 Wash. 2d 623, 639, 479 P.2d 1, 11 (1970); In
re Soderstran's Estate, 35 Wash. 2d 448, 464, 213 P.2d 949, 958 (1950). Not all
jurisdictions demand this high a standard. See ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 101 at 549; 3
PAGE ON WiLis, supra note 8, § 29.81.
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of such will or the death of the testator, every such testator,
as to such child or children not named or provided for, shall
be deemed to die intestate, and such child or children or
their descendants shall be entitled to such proportion of the
estate of the testator, real and personal, as if he had died
intestate, and the same shall be assigned to them, and all the
other heirs, devisees and legatees shall refund their proportional part.
There has never been any question, in Washington or elsewhere, as to what is the intended goal of the pretermitted heir
statute: it is meant only to protect against inadvertent omission
(pretermission) of certain of the testator's heirs.' 5 2 It is not
intended to prevent or even discourage the intentional disinheritance of children or any other heirs. Nevertheless, despite
this clear dependence upon the intent of the testator, Washington's statute has been interpreted to be of the "Missouri type,"
which means that extrinsic evidence of the testator's true
intent in omitting the child in question is absolutely
excluded.' 5 3 As will be seen, these sometimes-conflicting policies can create difficulties for courts in applying the statute to
carry out its professed legislative policy.
1.

Applicability to Descendants of Children

At first glance, it would appear that the statute protects
not only children of the testator who are omitted from his will,
but also "descendants of such child or children" who are omitted. However, the statute has been construed as not applying to
TM
the supreme
such descendants. In In re Estate of Hastings,
55
broke the
court, adopting the analysis of an earlier court,'
statute down into its three component parts: the "conditional"
clause, the "intestacy" clause, and the "resulting" clause."
Although the term "descendants" is found in the first and
third clauses, it is missing from the "intestacy" clause, and
152. See, e.g., Bower v. Bower, 5 Wash. 225, 227, 31 P. 598, 599 (1892); In re Estate
of Hastings, 88 Wash. 2d 788, 792, 567 P.2d 200, 204 (1977). See generally Nicholson v.
Sorensen, 517 P.2d 766, 770 (Alaska, 1973); ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 36 at 141; 2 PAGE
ON WILLS, supra note 8, § 21.105 at 529; Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 616, 623 (1963). Statutes
vary in the heirs whom they protect: some (like Washington's) protect only children
of the testator, whereas others protect a broader range of heirs.
153. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marshall, 27 Wash. App. 895, 621 P.2d 187 (1980);
Atkinson, supra note 5, § 36 at 141.
154. 88 Wash. 2d 788, 567 P.2d 200 (1977).
155. In re Estate of Phillips, 193 Wash. 194, 74 P.2d 1015 (1938).
156. 88 Wash. 2d at 796, 567 P.2d at 204.
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therefore there can be no intestacy as to a pretermitted descendant of a child. This, the court found, was a deliberate change
by the legislature when it amended the former statute, which
1 57
did include descendants in the intestacy clause.
The problem with this analysis is not its result, which
seems to be in keeping with the legislative intent, but its circuitous route necessitated by the statute's language. The legislature presumably left the term "descendants" in the first and
third clauses to make it clear that if a pretermitted child predeceased the testator, his (the child's) descendants could take
his intestate share by representation, an interpretation which
the court has adopted. 5 ' However, this could have been
accomplished by direct statement, rather than by implication.
If the legislature had written a new statute, instead of merely
tinkering with the language of the "intestacy" clause and
leaving the rest of the statute as it was, the present confusion
could have been avoided. The statute should be restated to
cover only omitted "children" (if that is what the legislature
desires), and a sentence should be added to the effect that, "if a
child of the testator who would have been entitled to an intestate share under this section dies before the testator leaving
issue who survive the testator, those issue shall take the intestate share which the child would have taken, by right of
representation."1

2.

59

The Naming "Qua Child" Dilemma

Another matter of ambiguity, but one more easily resolved
by a general change in the statutory approach (to be discussed
below) than by direct language, is the effect of "naming" a
child in fact, but not "qua child." The background of this
dilemma begins in 1899 with the case of In re Estate of
Gorkow.6 o
In Gorkow the court held that a gift to a misnamed illegiti157. Id at 796-97, 567 P.2d at 204.
158. Id at 797, 567 P.2d at 204-05.
159. Note that if a descendant of an omitted predeceased

child is otherwise

provided for in the will, that person could end up with both his own share and that of
his omitted ancestor. (It is not clear whether or not the present wording of the
"conditional" clause is intended to address this question.) This is not so much illogical

as troubling, because it seems so unlikely that when a grandchild has been provided
for, the grandchild's parent has been totally forgotten. Thus this situation should be
addressed in the area of determining whether the omission of the child was in fact
inadvertent, to be discussed below.
160. 20 Wash. 563, 56 P. 385 (1899).
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mate child (reference to a son Arthur as "Otto") described
merely as the son of a woman also mentioned in the will,
would not render him a pretermitted child. The court pointed
out that the woman had only one son, and that that child was
"in the testator's mind" when he executed the will, which is all
that the statute requires. 1 61 This seemed to be a sensible
approach to the "named or provided for" requirement of the
statute. But later courts, with respect to the requirement of
"naming," began to read into the statute a requirement that a
child not just be "in the testator's mind," but be referred to as
the testator's child, or at least not be referred to in any other
capacity.
In In re Estate of Hamilton,6 2 the testator executed a will
giving one dollar to his "step-daughter" S, describing her as
such, together with a like amount to his (second) wife and his
stepson. (The bulk of his estate went to his natural son and
daughter, by his deceased first wife.) Four years later, the testator formally adopted S. He did not alter his will following
the adoption. The court held that the naming of S was not sufficient to prevent the application of the pretermitted heir statute, because the testator did not name her (in fact, could not
name her) as his "child," since she did not become his "child"
for purposes of the statute until she was adopted. 163 There was
no indication on the face of the will that the testator had contemplated, at the time of execution, the subsequent adoption of
S. As a result, S took an intestate share of the estate, probably
the same amount as passed under the will to the natural children. It is unclear whether the same result would have followed had S been named without reference to her as a "stepdaughter," and without any other description. Gorkow would
seem to argue that such naming is sufficient.
The Hamilton decision may be an example of "hard cases
making bad law." To avoid the prospect of leaving the testator's adopted daughter with one dollar, the court seems to have
laid a formidable trap for the unwary testator. Consider the
case of stepdaughter D, who, together with all of the testator's
natural children, is expressly (qua "step-daughter") disinherited, perhaps because the testator is confident that his widow
will provide for the children. Four years later, D is adopted,
161. Id. at 571, 56 P. at 388.

162. 73 Wash. 2d 865, 441 P.2d 768 (1968).
163. Id. at 867, 441 P.2d at 770.
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and the testator, still of the same mind, does not see any reason to change his will. (Even a testator who has been warned
that omitted children will take a share of his estate would be
likely to consider D to have been included in the will.) If the
Hamilton case is followed, D will not have been "named,"
although the other children will, with the dubious result that
D receives her intestate share of the testator's estate (as the
testator did not intend, and as he thought he had expressly
avoided), while the other children receive nothing.
The Hamilton interpretation renders the pretermitted
heir statute inconsistent with the similarly worded (and intentioned) post-testamentary spouse statute.'64 The latter has
been construed to require mention of a spouse not qua spouse
(or, as some jurisdictions require, "in contemplation of marriage"), but merely in fact.16 5 The Hamilton court rejected this
authority as inapplicable, involving "a wife, and not a child,
and a statute considerably different from RCW 11.12.090...,,66
While the statutes are "different," the differences are not considerable and do not seem to relate to the question at hand.
Both statutes are intended to prevent only unintentional omission. 167 The pretermitted heir statute requires that the child
be "named," while the post-testamentary spouse statute
requires that the spouse be "mentioned . . . as to show an

intention not to make such provision." (If anything, the case
for going beyond mere naming seems stronger in the latter
instance.) Not only did the court fail to address why the two
are not to be treated alike, but it ignored the fact that the primary authority on which it relied, the New York case of In re
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.050 (1967) provides that:

If, after making any will, the testator shall marry and the spouse shall be
living at the time of the death of the testator, such will shall be deemed
revoked as to such spouse, unless provision shall have been made for such
survivor by marriage settlement, or unless such survivor be provided for in
the will or in such way mentioned therein as to show an intention not to

make such provision, and no other evidence to rebut the presumption of
revocation shall be received.
165. Thus, mention of a woman merely by name was sufficient to avoid the
statute, although the testator married her after execution of the will. In re Estate of

Steele, 45 Wash. 2d 58, 273 P.2d 235 (1954). See also, In re Estate of Adler, 52 Wash.
539, 100 P. 1019 (1909) (provision for wife described merely as "friend"). Although the
testator in Steele was already engaged to the named woman at the time of execution,
this fact was not mentioned in the will, and the court gave it no weight in its reasoning

(nor could it, the fact being prohibited extrinsic evidence).
166. 73 Wash. 2d at 868, 441 P.2d at 770.
167. See, e.g., Estate of Nelson, 85 Wash. 2d 602, 612, 537 P.2d 765, 772 (1975).
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Estate of Guilmartin,168 based its own decision on a direct analogy to New York's post-testamentary spouse statute, finding
the two statutes to be indistinguishable, and their policies
"identical."' 6 9 Unlike Washington, however, New York at that
time interpreted its post-testamentary spouse statute as requiring reference to the spouse as spouse, and the Guilmartin
court merely adopted that interpretation for the pretermitted
heir statute. The Hamilton decision, in contrast, creates an
anomalous divergence between similarly, if not identically,
grounded statutes.
Relying on Hamilton, the court of appeals in In re Estate
of Marshall 7 ° held that a testatrix's niece, J, who had been
adopted before the execution of the will, but who was
described in the will by name but as a niece, was a pretermitted heir because she had not been named as a child. Although
misdescription of a child who is already of that status is as
likely a sign of inadvertent disinheritance as is misdescription
due to subsequent adoption (as in Hamilton), logic would seem
to point the other way. Here, however, there was the complicating factor that the testatrix had also stated in the will that
she had no children, natural or adopted. In other words, the
testatrix clearly had J "in mind," but possibly did not recall
whether the child's relationship to her was that of niece or
adopted daughter.' 7 ' It is not entirely clear whether the result
would have been different had the testatrix simply mentioned
her "niece J," without a statement that she had no children.
Especially because (unlike Hamilton) there was no later
change in status, naming J without mention of her status as a
child presumably would-and clearly should-have sufficed." 2
An important variation on this theme is found in In re
Peterson's Estate.7 3 As in Marshall, the testator expressly
stated that he had no children. In fact, however, he had
168. In re Estate of Guilmartin, 156 Misc. 699, 282 N.Y.S. 525 (1935). The court's
other authority, In re Estate of Reed, 19 N.J. Super. 387, 88 A.2d 690 (1952), concerned
a very differently worded statute, and itself relied heavily upon Guilmartin.
169. In re Estate of Guilmartin, 156 Misc. at 704, 282 N.Y.S. at 529.
170. 27 Wash. App. 895, 621 P.2d 187 (1980).
171. In fact, the testatrix's uncertainty as to whether J had been adopted (but
with no indication that this affected the testatrix's opinion as to how J should be
treated in the will) was supported by extrinsic evidence that the court ruled
inadmissible. Id at 899, 621 P.2d at 189.
172. Compare Gorkow's Estate, discussed at text accompanying notes 160-61,
supra.
173. 74 Wash. 2d 91, 442 P.2d 980 (1968).
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fathered a child, only legitimate because he had married the
mother (under threat of prosecution for seduction) just before
the child's birth, and had divorced her just after. The testator
never further acknowledged the existence of the child (even in
the divorce proceedings), despite attempts by the mother to
convince him to do so. He obviously desired to have no connection with the child whatsoever, and followed that policy for the
almost 40 years between the birth of the child and the testator's death. (He did make a financial settlement with the
mother that included there being no further demands on him
respecting her or the child.) The court refused to consider the
statement that the testator had "no children" to be a sufficient
"naming" of this child and thus the child took the entire
estate. 1 74 Instead of the required description (by class) coupled
with an expression of a clear intention to disinherit, the court
found this to be a mere "mistaken denial" of having
children. 5
In In re Estate of Bouchat,176 Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals (the division that decided Marshall)
appeared to repudiate its earlier premise. In Bouchat the testator left his entire estate to an unrelated person, stating in his
will that he had "no children now living," but that his "wife,
now deceased had two children by a prior marriage. . ..." whom

he named. He then expressly disinherited those named (step-)
children, Franklin and Lilly. 177 In fact, however, Franklin and
Lilly were the testator's natural children, with whom he had
not communicated in over 40 years.
Under the reasoning of Marshall,Hamilton, and Peterson,
the Bouchat children should have been deemed pretermitted,
because from all that appears on the face of the will, the testator mistakenly believed that he had no natural children and
174. Id. at 94-95, 442 P.2d at 983.
175. While the Peterson result may have been inevitable, given the Washington
court's refusal to admit parol evidence as to the testator's true intent, it raises an
interesting dilemma for the practitioner. In Peterson the child was legitimate, but
apparently only because of a "shotgun wedding," and the testator clearly knew of but
wished in no way to acknowledge the child's existence. But even had the child been
illegitimate, and the testator thus presumably even more reluctant to acknowledge its
existence, and no matter what provision outside of the will had already been made for
it, the result would have been the same. A practitioner is thus faced with the twofold
dilemma that the testator in such a circumstance may not volunteer the fact of the
unwanted child's existence, or if he does (spontaneously or after delicate inquiry), he
may refuse to acknowledge the child in a public document such as his will.
176. 37 Wash. App. 304, 679 P.2d 426 (1984).
177. Id at 305, 679 P.2d at 427.
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that Franklin and Lilly were only his step-children. The children apparently so argued; but the court, in a footnote,
rejected the notion that Marshall "establish[ed] an inflexible
rule that children must be named as children in a will or else
be deemed pretermitted."' 7 8
The Bouchat court attempted to distinguish Marshall on
the ground that in the latter case the erroneous description
was just "one indicia [sic] of the child's pretermitted status.
That the adopted child was not explicitly disinherited was
another indicia."' 7 9 In fact, according to Bouchat, "Marshall
was simply another in a long line of cases which resolved this
question by attempting to discern the intent of the testator."' 8 0
It seems that Bouchat reached the proper result, on the proper
basis---discerning the testator's true intent with respect to the
specific individuals in question. The court, however, did so by
a questionable reading (in fact a seeming repudiation) of Marshall, and with no attempt to deal with the implications of the
supreme court's still-existing decision in Hamilton. Because in
Bouchat the testator specifically stated that he had "no children," and named his children as step-children only, the only
real distinction in terms between Marshall and Bouchat would
seem to be that, as the Bouchat court noted, in Marshall the
niece had not been expressly disinherited-she had simply
been acknowledged and then given nothing. This difference in
language is a shaky foundation on which to build a doctrine,
and it is far from convincing. The only distinction should be,
as the Bouchat court stated, whether from all of the will's
"indicia" it appears that the testator had his children in mind
and intended to disinherit them, and thus did not do so
through "inadvertence or oversight."' 181 In other words, the
proper question is whether, had the testator recalled that
Franklin and Lilly were his natural children (if indeed he had
actually forgotten this fact)," 2 he still would have disinherited
them. It seems quite likely that he would have, and the trial
and appellate courts agreed when they found neither the chil178. Id. at 306 n. 1, 679 P.2d at 427. Of course, if there was such a "rule," it was
established by Hamilton, not Marshall. Hamilton, perhaps distinguishable because it
concerned an adoption after execution of the will, was not mentioned in Bouchat.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id at 306, 679 P.2d at 427.
182. The trial court's opinion implied that after 40 years he simply "did not think
of them as 'his' children." Id. at 309, 679 P.2d at 428.
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dren pretermitted nor the testator incompetent for mislabeling
them.
Unfortunately, as Marshall illustrates, discovery of the
testator's true intent from the face of the will (extrinsic evidence being disallowed) can be quite difficult; and this difficulty is what makes mechanical rules so attractive to courts.
At the very least, extrinsic evidence should be admissible
where the terms of the will, by both naming the testator's children and denying their existence or their status as children,
leaves the intention behind their disinheritance ambiguous.
Bouchat not only repudiated the rigid "qua child" analysis
of Marshall, but it also indicated that an express statement
that the testator has "no children," when in fact he has children living, will not necessarily render the children pretermitted, even (or at least?) when combined with a misdescription
of them. However, it may be too soon to consider the "qua
child" doctrine defunct. The supreme court applied the doctrine in Hamilton... (a case in which, unlike either Marshall
or Bouchat, the child was adopted after the date of execution),
seemingly reinforced its "mistaken denial" aspect in Peterson,'14 and has not had an opportunity to consider this latest
interpretation. No petition for hearing was filed in Bouchat;
and the court in Bouchat did not really analyze the problem in
a convincing fashion, preferring to sidestep it by retreating
from Marshall's broad implications. Nevertheless, Bouchat is
an important application of what Washington (and other)
courts have long acknowledged-that a proper interpretation
of the pretermitted heir statute seeks the testator's true intent,
and deems "pretermitted" only those children omitted from a
will through "inadvertence or oversight."1" 5
The "qua child" dilemma could be resolved by inserting
into the statute a proviso that "a child need not be named in its
capacity as child in order to satisfy the requirement that it be
'named'." (Of course, if the legislature wished to adopt the
Hamilton court's position, it could substitute "must" for "need
not.") There may, however, be a better way, one that retains
protection for the child who in fact would have been given a
183. 73 Wash. 2d 865, 441 P.2d 768.
184. 74 Wash. 2d 91, 442 P.2d 980.
185. In an even more recent case, Division Two followed the "testator's intent"
approach to "naming" where the child was misdescribed, although the court (because
it found a "provision" for the child) had no need to pursue the matter in detail. In re
Estate of Davidson, 37 Wash. App. 886, 683 P.2d 620 (1984).
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greater share of the estate qua child than in its named capacity. If, as suggested below, the legislature changes the statute
to limit its effect to children born or adopted after the execution of the will and to permit the admission of extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent, most of the cases of this nature
would resolve themselves without further language. Children
adopted before the execution of the will (as in Marshall) would
not be considered pretermitted. Children adopted after execution but "named" in another capacity in the will (as in Hamilton) would be included, although usually extrinsic or intrinsic
evidence (as in Bouchat) would indicate whether continued
omission after adoption was likely to have been inadvertent or
intentional. Specific language relating to the capacity in which
a child must be named could also be added to cover the rare
case unresolved by either provision.
3.

Changing the Statute's Approach

Washington's pretermitted heir statute has been referred
to as "a legal quagmire of fortuitous and subterranean tampering with the power of testamentary disinheritance of children."1" 6 It is certainly a statute that seems in its present
configuration and under present interpretation to serve poorly
its professed purpose.
As indicated earlier, the only supposed purpose of the
pretermitted heir statute is to protect children from inadvertent omission from a parent's will." 7 While this policy of
countenancing intentional disinheritance might be criticized as
ill-advised, 8 ' I proceed on the premise that Washington, like
most other states, will continue for the foreseeable future to
espouse that policy, and therefore continue to require a statute
which permits intentional and prevents only inadvertent disinheritance. Upon this premise, the present statute can be evaluated in terms of how well it accomplishes that goal.
a. Application Only to Children Born After Execution
The Washington pretermitted heir statute applies to chil186. Rein, A More Rational System for the Protection of Family Members Against
Disinheritance:A Critique of Washington's Pretermitted Heir Statute and Other
Matters, 15 Gonz. L. Rev. 11, 23 (1979) [hereinafter Rein].
187. See, e.g., Bower v. Bower, 5 Wash. 225, 227, 31 P. 598, 599 (1892); In re Estate
of Hastings, 88 Wash. 2d 788, 792, 567 P.2d 200, 202 (1977).
188. See generally Rein, supra note 186.
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dren born either before or after execution of the testator's
will." 9 Yet it has been pointed out with some justification that
in these times of professionally drawn wills, small families, and
modern communication and travel, a truly inadvertent omission of a living child, due to either mistake or forgetfulness, is
akin to "misplacing a house-not very likely."' '
In fact, such
a lapse of memory could, under some circumstances, cast doubt
on the testator's testamentary capacity, his ability to recall the
"natural objects of his bounty."' 9 ' The supreme court has
agreed that "reason would tell us that, if a child is omitted
from a will, the omission is most likely intentional rather than
an oversight."' 92 In other words, in the great majority of the
relatively few cases in which a testator has omitted any reference whatsoever to a living child, that omission will likely have
been intentional.
On the other hand, failure to mention a child who is born
after execution of the will is quite understandable. In fact,
even the testator who wishes to disinherit afterborn children
by express provision is limited to a general reference to a class
because there are not yet individuals who can be "named."'"
Therefore if the statute is to presume inadvertent omission
from failure to disinherit expressly, and from that fact
alone, 9 4 this seems justifiable only in the case of afterborn
children.
It might be argued that it is worth giving an intestate
share to an occasional omitted child who was intended to be
disinherited, in order to prevent disinheritance of even the
rare child who was omitted by true inadvertence. The effect of
giving that "occasional" omitted child a share, however, can be
189. In re Estate of Hastings, 88 Wash. 2d 788, 789 n.1, 567 P.2d 200, 201 n.1 (1977).
It does not, however, apply to children already deceased at the time of execution. Id.
at 788, 567 P.2d at 200.
190. Rein, supra note 186, at 24-25. See also In re Estate of Hastings, 88 Wash. 2d
788, 796, 567 P.2d 200, 204 (1977); Evans, Should Pretermitted Issue be Entitled to
Inherit?,31 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 269 (1943); Matthews, PretermittedHeirs: An Analysis
of Statutes, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 748, 752 (1929).
191. ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 38; Rein, supra note 186, at 25.
192. In re Estate of Hastings, 88 Wash. 2d 788, 796, 567 P.2d 200, 204 (1977).
193. Such a naming by class will suffice, at least if coupled with language
indicating an intention either to provide for or to disinherit them. See Gehlen v.
Gehlen, 77 Wash. 17, 137 P. 312 (1913); In re Peterson's Estate, 74 Wash. 2d 91, 442 P.2d
980 (1968).
194. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. If extrinsic evidence were
available to elucidate the testator's intent in such cases, there would be greater
justification for including existing children.
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devastating on the testator's overall testamentary plan. Suppose, for example, that testator T wishes to treat his wife more
favorably than either of his children, A and B, except he wants
his favored child A to have the family home. The rest of his
separate estate T leaves to his wife W. The separate estate is
valued at $400,000, including the home worth $100,000. If T
forgets to, or out of delicacy does not, expressly name or disinherit B, then B will take his intestate share of the estate, oneUnder Washington's pretermission statquarter or $100,000.'
ute, the other gifts would abate ratably, with B's $100,000
taken ratably from A and from W. The result is that B would
end up with more than A, and A with only a share of the family home or its proceeds.' 96
Another problem with including existing children has
already been discussed: the question whether "naming" in
some capacity other than as child (adopted child C named as
"stepchild C") is sufficient to avoid pretermission. If only
those children born or adopted after execution of the will were
included, many of these cases would be moot; only where a
child was named in some other capacity and then adopted after
execution of the will would there still be a need for extrinsic
evidence or a presumption of pretermission.
An analogy might be drawn to the post-testamentary
spouse statute, section 11.12.050, which as indicated has the
same purpose of avoiding unintentional omission as does the
pretermitted heir statute. 19 7 The spouse statute applies only to
marriages occurring after the execution of the will. While it is
more likely that a testator will forget he has a child than a
spouse, and while it is possible that a testator will inadvertently fail to mention either, both possibilities seem sufficiently unlikely to warrant a presumption against, rather than
for, such an eventuality.
The modern approach to the coverage of pretermitted heir
statutes is represented by section 2-302 of the Uniform Probate
Code, which limits the statute's effect to children born or
This confines the statadopted after execution of the will.'
195. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.015 (1985).
196. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.090 (1985). This is at least better than the result in
those jurisdictions which apply the general abatement scheme to such cases, so that B's
entire share might come from that of whoever has a general or residual gift, whether
A or, as in this case, W.
197. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
198. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-302(b) (1983) does include the living child
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ute's operation primarily to the testator who fails to provide
for (or "name") such afterborn children and who also neglects
to amend his will to take them into account after their birththe most likely case for truly inadvertent pretermission.
b.

Admission of Extrinsic Evidence

As mentioned above, Washington is considered to have a
"Missouri-type" statute, which precludes the introduction of
extrinsic evidence of the testator's actual intent in omitting a
child.'9 9 This interpretation, which is usual among states with
similarly-worded statutes, is based on the fact that the statute
has no express reference to the testator's intent, and no provision for admission of extrinsic evidence. 0 0 In contrast, statutes
that provide for a pretermitted heir "unless it appears that
omission was intentional," so-called "Massachusetts-type" statutes, are generally construed to permit the admission of extrinsic evidence. 20 ' Thus the current state of the law is not a
matter of express legislative directive, but of settled statutory
construction. There is reason to believe that it is time for a
new directive; the courts are unhappy with, but consider themselves unable to change, the present construction.0 2 The legislature should amend the statute to permit the admission of
extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent to disinherit, especially if the statute continues to apply to existing children. If
the statute does not continue as it is, there is arguably less
need for extrinsic evidence because most cases of omission
without mention will likely be unintentional. However, if
admission of extrinsic evidence is combined with a limitation
to afterborn children, such a provision would properly create,
in effect, a rebuttable presumption of unintentional omission
in circumstances in which lack of intent is likely, but not certain, and therefore such a presumption is appropriate.
The attitude of early Washington courts was that the "sins
of avarice and false swearing would receive an impetus not
hitherto dreamed of in connection with decedents' estates" if
omitted solely because he was believed by the testator to be dead; however, the
problems of proof and possible false claims of such an error would seem to argue
against such a specialized exception.
199. See supra note 153.
200. See, e.g., ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 36 at 141; In re Estate of Hastings, 88
Wash. 2d 788, 794-95, 567 P.2d 200, 203 (1977).
201. ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 36 at 141.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 203-11.
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parol evidence of the testator's intent to disinherit were admitted.2 °3 Yet such prophesies of doom seem misplaced in light of
the long-standing operation of "Massachusetts-type" statutes in
so many jurisdictions, 2° especially in an era of changes in the
law of evidence that increase rather than decrease the ease of
20 5
admissibility of hitherto suspect categories of proof.

More recently, courts have viewed the prohibition of
extrinsic evidence with less favor. Sometimes a court has
attempted to avoid the prohibition by applying a different evidentiary rule, as when the court in In re Harper's Estate2 °6
invoked the rule admitting extrinsic evidence to interpret the
meaning of ambiguous or uncertain language to determine
whether a gift to the testator's "heir" was meant to include the
testator's child.20 7 (In re Estate of Ridgway 20 8 later disapproved the Harper approach as inconsistent with the requirement that the language itself convey the testator's intent.20 9 )
The clearest recent indication of judicial disagreement
with the current state of the law is found in In re Estate of
2 0
Hastings.
" The supreme court there made it clear that in its
opinion the policy of protecting against only a truly inadvertent omission was not furthered by the current statute as pres203. Hill v. Hill, 7 Wash. 409, 412, 35 P. 360, 361 (1893).
204. See generally, ATKINSON, supra note 5, § 36 at 141-43; Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 616

(1963).
205. Examples of liberalized admissibility include the rules of evidence regarding
interest, authentication, and hearsay. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 159-61, 700-01, 914-18

(3d ed. 1984). Courts and legislatures have become more willing to let the potential for
fraud or falsity be addressed by the adversarial trial process, rather than by outright
exclusion. Id. Interestingly, the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 2-302 (1986) confines
evidence of intentional omission to the will, except that extrinsic evidence may be used
to prove that a transfer outside the will was intended to be in lieu of a testamentary
gift. (It is unclear what evidence is admissible to prove that the testator incorrectly

believed his child to be dead, under § 2-302(b)). Whatever the merits of the prohibition
of extrinsic evidence, it creates far less difficulty (and is far more logical) in a statute
applying only to children born after execution of the will. The post-testamentary
spouse statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.050 (1985), expressly prohibits extrinsic

evidence which rebuts the presumption of revocation upon subsequent marriage.
However, that statute applies only to the far stronger presumption which attaches to
omission of a spouse whom the testator married subsequent to execution; it also
reflects the greater concern the probate law has generally had with protection of a

spouse, who can then be relied upon to protect the children.
206. 168 Wash. 98, 10 P.2d 991 (1932).
207. Id. at 106-07, 10 P.2d at 993-94.

208. 33 Wash. 2d 249, 205 P.2d 360 (1949).
209. Id at 253-54, 205 P.2d at 363 (citing Gehlen v. Gehlen, 77 Wash. 17, 137 P. 312
(1913)).
210. 88 Wash. 2d 788, 567 P.2d 200 (1977).
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ently construed. However, while it approved of those cases
that had given "de facto" consideration to the testator's intent,
it did not overrule the more rigid cases confining evidence of
intent to the four corners of the will.21 1 Instead, the Hastings
court took the approach of construing the statute so as to
achieve the result the testator probably intended. Clearly the
better alternative would be to permit the use of whatever evidence might be available in order to construe the will to
achieve that result. The need to avoid speculation as to the
intent of a testator no longer able to explain it for himself, and
the possibilities of fraud that this raises, can be addressed by
careful application of the high standard of proof required in
will contests.
C. Absentee Beneficiaries
Chapter 11.80 of the Revised Code of Washington deals
with appointment of a trustee for the conservation and ultimate distribution of property that belongs to a person determined to be absent from the county in which the property is
located. Included are provisions for final distribution of the
property if the absentee has not been located within seven
years, in essence as if the absentee were deceased.2 12 This
chapter contains various safeguards intended to give the absentee notice and to ensure that a diligent search has been made
before his property is distributed.21 3 While there are questions
that can be raised as to the constitutionality of these provisions
in light of current notions of due process, 2 14 for present purposes it will be assumed that these safeguards are sufficient to
protect the absentee and his heirs. Two questions arise, however, with respect to absentees who are themselves beneficiaries under the will of a deceased testator. Both questions
derive from a lack of clarity or consistency in the applicable
statutory language.
1.

The Absentee Beneficiary

Under section 11.12.120 of the Revised Code of Washington,21 5 if a gift to a beneficiary is subject to an express condi211. Id at 795-98, 567 P.2d at 204-05.
212. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.80.080-.110 (1985).
213. See WASH. REV. CODE § § 11.80.010, .080, .100 (1985).
214. See M. REUTLINGER & W. OLTMAN, supra note 1, at 388-90.
215. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.120 (1985) provides:

Whenever any person having died leaving a will which has been admitted to
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tion that he survive the testator, failure of proof within three
years of probate that he did in fact survive creates a lapse.
This is no surprise, because even if there is no express survival
condition, a gift to a beneficiary who predeceases the testator
lapses, unless saved by section 11.12.110,216 the anti-lapse statute. Section 11.12.130,217 however, provides that in the case of
an express survival contingency, if within the three-year
period it is proven that the beneficiary did survive but is an
"absentee" within chapter 11.80, the gift is distributed to a
trustee under that chapter, as for any other absentee. A
scheme of notice and hearing procedures similar to that of
chapter 11.80 is set out in section 11.12.150.21" Note that these
provisions for distribution appear to apply only to beneficiaries
subject to an express survival contingency, as defined in section 11.12.120, and this is where the difficulty begins.
It is quite possible that even a beneficiary not subject to an
express condition of survival might be alive at the testator's
death but be an absentee at the time of distribution, and in fact
there are provisions which seem to address this situation.
Chapter 11.76 of the Revised Code of Washington relates to the
settlement of estates and contains a series of steps to be taken
when an estate, in the language of section 11.76.200, "has been
or is about to be distributed" to "any person who has not been
located. 2 19

Such a missing person would seem also to be

within the broader definition of "absentee" under chapter
probate or established by an adjudication of testacy, shall by said will have
given, devised or bequeathed unto any person, a legacy or a devise upon the
condition that said person survive him, and not otherwise, such legacy or
devise shall lapse and fall into the residue of said estate to be distributed
according to the residuary clause, if there be one, of said will, and if there be
none then according to the laws of descent, unless said legatee or devisee, as
the case may be, or his heirs, personal representative, or someone in behalf of
such legatee or devisee, shall appear before the court which is administering
said estate within three years from and after the date the said will was
admitted to probate or established by an adjudication of testacy, and prove to
the satisfaction of the court that the said legatee or devisee, as the case may

be, did in fact survive the testator.
216. For the text of § 11.12.110, see note 227, infra.
217. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.130 (1985) provides:

If it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of said court within the time
fixed by RCW 11.12.120 that such legatee or devisee, as the case may be, did in
fact survive the testator, but that such legatee, or devisee, is an absentee
within the meaning of chapter 11.80, then and in that event the court shall by
appropriate order direct the said legacy or devise to be distributed to a trustee

appointed and qualified as provided for in said chapter 11.80.
218. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
219. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.200 (1985).
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11.80, and it is not clear why the legislature did not adopt the
latter definition, as it did in section 11.12.130. As it stands, the
treatment of "unlocated" beneficiaries under chapter 11.76
does not refer to, and apparently is not governed by, the provisions of chapter 11.80. It provides merely for distribution to an
"agent" who is appointed for the purpose 220 and who must post
a bond,2 1 delivery to the county treasury after three years,22 2
and either probate proceedings or escheat if there is no claim
by the absentee after four more years.2 2 3 What chapter 11.76
does not seem to contain is any provision for notice to the
absentee, or procedures to ensure a diligent search, as found in
both chapter 11.80 and section 11.12.150. Even if this is not a
constitutional problem of due process (and it may well be),2 24
it certainly is one of unexplained inconsistency with the other
absentee provisions. The explanation, such as it is, may be that
until 1955, chapter 11.76 was devoted not to "unlocated" beneficiaries, but to "nonresident"distributees, 225 and the question of
absence in the sense of "missing" was not paramount.
It is not clear whether the provisions of chapter 11.76
apply to the absentee beneficiary whose gift was subject to an
express survival contingency. If such a person has survived the
testator but is an "absentee," section 11.12.130 would seem to
direct distribution under chapter 11.80. Yet if he "has not been
located," chapter 11.76 seems to apply as well. Here the
answer may be that because of the provisions of section
11.12.130, there is no time at which the estate will be "about to
be distributed" to such an absentee/unlocated person, and
therefore section 11.76.200 will never apply to him.22 6
That leaves only the absentee who is not subject to an
express survival contingency, and who appears to be dealt with
in a manner different from his survival-contingency counterpart. If he "has not been located" at the time of distribution,
with no indication of what if any procedures are to be followed
in an attempt to locate him, his gift seems to fall under the
220. Id
221. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.210 (1985).

222. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.76.220 (1985).
223. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.76.240-.250 (1985). It is not clear whether the probate
would be of the entire estate of the absentee or only of the unclaimed proceeds.
224. See supra note 214.
225. REM. REV. STAT. § 1535.
226. Of course, if he is not shown to have survived, there can be no distribution for
three years, and at the end of that time the gift will lapse under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.12.120 (1985), and again section 11.76.200 will not apply.
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"agency" rules of chapter 11.76. There is no apparent reason
to treat this class of beneficiaries differently from those whose
gift was subject to an express survival contingency. Even if
there were, there is no reason to have two different sets of procedures for absent beneficiaries, especially when one provides
far more protection for the absentee and his successors than
does the other. If the provisions of chapter 11.80 are appropriate to deal with the property of missing persons generally, they
should be appropriate to deal with missing beneficiaries.
2.

Lapse and the Absentee Beneficiary

One of the strangest inconsistencies produced by the
"absentee" provisions of chapter 11.76 is the insertion in the
1955 amendments of a separate "anti-lapse" provision for
"unlocated" beneficiaries. Washington has a fairly standard
anti-lapse statute, section 11.12.110,227 under which a gift to a

designated beneficiary will not lapse if the beneficiary predeceases the testator but leaves lineal descendants who can take
in his place. The class of designated beneficiaries includes only
a "child, grandchild, or other relative of the testator," and specifically does not include a spouse. One would expect that this
limitation to blood relatives, intended to restrict the statute's
abrogation of the doctrine of lapse to those instances in which
substitution of another taker would most likely follow the testator's intent,228 would apply whether or not the beneficiary
had been "located" at the time of initial distribution of the
estate. One would, however, be incorrect.
Under section 11.76.240 of the Revised Code of Washington, if, during the seven years the property of an "unlocated"
beneficiary is held by the court-appointed agent or the county
treasury, "it clearly appears that such person died prior to the
decedent in whose estate distribution was made to him, but
227. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.110 (1985) provides:

When any estate shall be devised or bequeathed to any child, grandchild, or
other relative of the testator, and such devisee or legatee shall die before the
testator, having lineal descendants who survive the testator, such descendants
shall take the estate, real and personal, as such devisee or legatee would have
done in the case he had survived the testator; if such descendants are all in
the same degree of kinship to the predeceased devisee or legatee they shall
take equally, or if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree shall
take by representation with respect to such predeceased devisee or legatee. A
spouse is not a relative under the provisions of this section.

228. See, e.g., Ruchert v. Boyd, 56 Wash. 2d 266, 352 P.2d 216 (1960); In re Renton's
Estate, 10 Wash. 533, 39 P. 145 (1895).
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leaving lineal descendants surviving, such lineal descendants
may claim." Because this language refers to "such absentee
person," and because the absentee is "any person who has not
been located," what results is a special anti-lapse statute, applicable only to absentees,2 29 and applying to all such beneficiaries,regardless of whether or not they are "relatives" of the
testator. In effect, the descendants of a nonrelative beneficiary
of the testator cannot take the share which their ancestor
would have received had he not predeceased the testator,
unless to their good fortune their ancestor cannot be "located"
at the time of distribution. In such a circumstance, the
descendants will take (to the exclusion of the testator's residuary beneficiaries) when the fact of their ancestor's prior death
is later discovered.2 3 °
The solution to this problem is quite simple: either the
anti-lapse language of section 11.76.240 should be eliminated
altogether, or it should incorporate, expressly or by reference,
the limitations of the general anti-lapse statute.
D.

The "Catch-22" Codicil

My final point illustrates the kind of confusion even a
seemingly straightforward definition can create. Washington's
probate code not only defines "will" as including codicils, 23 ' but
it defines "codicil" also, as an instrument that meets the formal requirements of a will and that "refers to an existing will
for the purpose of altering or changing the same.

' 232

Unfortu-

nately, instead of being a helpful guide for anyone unfamiliar
with probate terminology, this definition has created at best a
source of unnecessary confusion, and at worst a serious trap for
the unwary draftsman.
It was early decided that any document that did not meet
the definitional requirements for a codicil, including at the
time that it refer to and be "attached" to the will, could not be
probated as a codicil. 233 This was a logical enough conclusion.
229. That is, those not located at the time of distribution, but apparently not
known then to have predeceased the testator.
230. While it is not likely that this scenario would be deliberately orchestrated, it
makes no more sense as an inadvertent than as a deliberate result of the described
circumstances.
231. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(8) (1985). See supra notes 29-30, 36 and
accompanying text.
232. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(9) (1985).
233. State ex rel. Schirmer v. Superior Court, 143 Wash. 578, 255 P. 960 (1927),
explained in In re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wash. 2d 833, 851, 176 P.2d 281, 290 (1947).
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It was further held, however, that if the second instrument
was intended to be a codicil (that is, was intended to dispose of
only part of the testator's estate and not intended to be his
a
only will), it could be probated as a codicil only, and not as235
As a result, the court in In re Whittier's Estate
"will." 2
reached the absurd position that an instrument executed with
all of the formalities of a will, but intended to dispose of only a
part of the testator's estate, and which would have been valid if
it had been the first or only will of the testator, was invalid
either as a will or as a codicil because there already existed
another will, to which the second instrument neglected to
make reference.2 3 6 The document was caught in limbo because
it looked like a will, but was intended as a codicil, and so qualified as neither.2 3 7
Whittier has not been overruled, and the legislature
apparently adopted the court's position when it enacted a definition of "codicil" which includes a requirement of reference to
the earlier will. However, by a later amendment to the code
the legislature expanded the definition of "will" to include any
instrument "validly executed as required by RCW 11.12.020,231
which would seem to accommodate the type of instrument in
Whittier, which purports only to dispose of part of the estate
but does not qualify as a "codicil" because it does not refer
back to an existing will.2 1 Does this latest amendment permit
probate of such an instrument as a "will," even if not as a codicil? The answer is uncertain. The decision in Whittier not to
probate the codicil turned not on the definition of "will," but
on the definition of "codicil," specifically the requirements of
attachment and reference to an earlier will. When it originally
adopted the "reference to the will" part of the Whittier definition, the legislature apparently intended to retain the rule
234. In re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wash. 2d at 847-48, 176 P.2d at 288.
235. See supra note 233.
236. Whittier's definition of "codicil" as requiring reference to the earlier will was
derived not from a statute, but from various secondary sources. 26 Wash. 2d at 846-47,
176 P.2d at 288.
237. One is reminded of the Virginia cases of Noble v. Tipton, 76 N.E. 151 (Va.
1905), and Noble v. Fickes, 82 N.E. 950 (Va. 1907), in which an instrument (an
undelivered deed) was first denied effect as a deed because it was intended as a
testamentary disposition, and then denied probate as a will because, on its face, it
lacked testamentary intent.
238. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.02.005(8) (Supp. 1986). The change was part of the
1982 probate code amendments, which primarily addressed the law of trusts.
239. The previous definition did not so clearly include such an instrument. See
supra note 36.
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denying probate to a "codicil" lacking such reference. 240 It is

less clear that by later expanding the definition of "will" the
legislature intended to change the rule. It should do so in clear
terms now.
To deny probate to a testamentary instrument, otherwise
validly executed, because it is not the testator's only will but
fails to conform to the technical definition of a codicil, exalts
form over substance and lays a formidable trap for the unwary,
all without any compensating benefit to testators, their heirs,
or the probate system.2 4 1
The matter should not be left to be resolved by implication
from the current definition of "will." The simplest way to
avoid further difficulty would be for the legislature to amend
the definition of codicil to delete the requirement of reference
to an existing will, or to add a statement that to be entitled to
probate, a subsequent testamentary instrument need not qualify as a "codicil" if it meets the formal requirements of a will.
Only then can we be certain we will not see a repetition of the
"catch-22" result in Whittier.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As indicated at the outset, many of the problems discussed
in this article are a result of the legislature's tendency to make
changes in one statute or another over time, without always
considering the effects of those changes on other parts of the
probate law. Other problems are the result of deliberate
choices by the legislature that reflect policies now in need of
re-examination. It would be tempting for the present legislature, to the extent it agrees that some or all of the above criticisms are well-founded, to continue to "patch" the law with
amendments addressing only the narrow points raised, hoping
not to create new problems elsewhere. Indeed, I have
attempted wherever possible to suggest language that would
240. See Stewart & Steincipher, supra note 80, at 881. But this apparently was not
the legislature's primary purpose. See supra note 80.
241. One benefit the legislature may have sought was to make it easier to construe
will and codicil as one document. Stewart & Steincipher, supra note 80. But this
benefit hardly seems worth the cost of frustrating a testator's intent as set out in an
otherwise-valid and properly executed tesatmentary instrument. The legislature
purported to eliminate the unpleasant "surprise" caused by inadvertent violation of
the attachment requirement (Id); but it retained the equally objectionable surprise
relating to reference to the will.
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make corrections with the least amount of change and disruptive effect.
Another alternative, however, would be to embark on a
more comprehensive review of the probate law of the state and
to draft a new probate code, incorporating the language of the
present statutes only where, after thorough reconsideration,
present law still seems appropriate in terms of both clarity and
policy. This should not mean substantial changes in the law,
because much of it will be found to be in no need of change.
Not only is much of current law already "up to date," but in
the area of probate law it would seem advisable to give considerable deference to precedent because expectations based on
existing law and the estate plans which they reflect extend
over such a long period of time, both past and future. Nevertheless, every isolated correction carries the danger of further
unanticipated conflict or confusion with other unconsidered
provisions or policies. A comprehensive approach, integrating
new and old language and policy in a logical statutory framework, is more likely to obviate the early need for further
patchwork.
Consideration and correction of the "legislative lapses" set
out here would be a good start. Perhaps, however, now that
the legislature has for the moment exhausted the attention
and resources given such well-publicized and politically volatile proposals as tort and sentencing reform, there will be an
opportunity to consider the more mundane, but potentially farreaching, subject of probate reform.

